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Recent Cases
SUBSTANTIATION REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAVEL,
ENTERTAINMENT, AND GIFT EXPENSES
William F. Sanford1
During 1968 taxpayer Sanford maintained a "diary" in which he
recorded his business entertainment expenses, mostly luncheons and din-
ners, as an outside salesman. Sanford's "diary" was a desk calendar, upon
which he entered the amount of individual expenditures (generally in
excess of $25), the date, the restaurant, and persons entertained. However,
the taxpayer either failed to obtain or did not retain supporting receipts
or other documentary evidence. Since these expenses were not reimbursed
by his employer, the taxpayer claimed a deduction from gross income in
the amount of $5,667.17. The Commissioner disallowed all expenditures of
$2.5 or more because the taxpayer failed to substantiate his expenses as
required by section 274 (d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and the
accompanying regulations. 2 The tax court sustained the Commissioner's
disallowance, holding that on these facts, a "diary", standing alone, does
not meet the "adequate records" or "sufficient evidence" requirement of
section 274(d), and that the regulations supporting the Commissioner's
position are valid.
Under the Cohan rule, 3 which prevailed prior to the enactment of
section 274 (d), widespread abuses developed in the use of expense accounts,
especially those related to entertainment expenses.4 Under the Cohan rule,
if the taxpayer could establish the making of the expenditure but could
not establish the amount, a court was required to approximate the amount
and allow the deduction. These lax requirements encouraged taxpayers to
report excessive amounts in expenses so that an approximation would at
least be equal to, if not greater than, the amount actually expended.5
Congress sought to put an end to this abuse by amending the code to re-
quire better records of expenses for travel, entertainment, and gifts.
The Revenue Act of 19626 added section 274 to the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954 and imposed a number of limitations on the allowance of
these types of deductions.7 The most controversial of these limitations is
1. 50 T.C. 823 (1968).
2. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (1962).
3. This "rule" derives its name from the case of Cohan v. Commissioner, 39
F.2d 540 (2d. Cir. 1930).
4. Caplin, The Travel and Entertainment Expense Problem, 39 TAXES 947
(1961).
5. Ibid.
6. Act of October 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 4, 76 Stat. 960.
7. It is important to note that the taxpayer must still satisfy the "ordinary
and necessary" requirement of a business expense under § 274. Section 274 acts as
a disallowance section in that it disallows an expense otherwise deductible under
another section of the code. Robert H. Alter, 50 T.C. 833 (1968).
(70)
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section 274(d)8 which clearly overrules the Cohan rule with respect to
travel, entertainment, and gift expenses. 9 In order for the taxpayer to
deduct entertainment expenses, he must substantiate, by adequate records
or sufficient evidence, specific elements of the expenditure.10 These
elements are: (1) cost, (2) time and place of the expense, (8) business
purpose of the expense, and (4) business relationship with the person enter-
tained. 1 The substantiation requirements for travel, entertainment facili-
ties, and gifts are similar. The importance of establishing each element
was emphasized in Henry E. Earle.12 In that decision the taxpayer retained
bills and receipts but failed to keep his own records as to the business
purpose of the expenditures. The tax court held that a failure to substanti-
ate all the elements as required by section 274 (d), in spite of the docu-
mentary evidence showing actual expenditure, was fatal to the deduction.'3
Although the statute is clear as to what the taxpayer is to substantiate,
it does not specify how the taxpayer is to substantiate.' 4 However, the regu-
lations set down definite rules for substantiation and dearly state what is
meant by "adequate records" and "sufficient evidence". 15 In order to meet
the adequate records requirement for an expense, the taxpayer must record
each element in a "diary", account book, or similar record.'6 Further, if
the expense is $25 or more or if it is for lodging away from home, then in
addition to the personal record, the taxpayer must furnish documentary
evidence such as receipts or paid bills.
In keeping a proper diary, account book, etc., it is necessary that entries
be made contemporaneously with the expenditure or as near in time as
possible.' 7 The Treasury recognizes that contemporaneous entries into a
record book have a much higher degree of credibility than entries made
subsequent to the expenditure.' 8 In Sanford the taxpayer's "diary" showed
an entertainment expense incurred in Chicago, while an expense voucher
turned in to Sanford's employer showed that the taxpayer was in New
York at the same time. The court said it was taking the view most charitable
to the taxpayer when it noted that the discrepancy might be accounted for
by the taxpayer's inaccurate recall resulting from the fact that he normally
made entries in his diary "some days" after the expenses were actually
8. Emmanuel and Lipoff, Travel and Entertainment: The New World of
Section 274, 18 TAx L. REv. 487, 516 (1963).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 23 (1962); S. RE,. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, 35 (1962).
10. INT. Rrv. CODE of 1954, § 274 (d).
11. Ibid.
12. 69,030 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. (1969).
13. Id. at 152.
14. Emmanuel and Lipoff, Travel and Entertainment: The New World of
Section 274, 18 TAx L. R1v.'487, 516 (1963).
15. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (2) (i) (1962). Express authority was given by
Congress to the Secretary to prescribe regulations. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
274 (h).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (1962). William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823 (1968).
17. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (2) (ii) (1962). In Henry E. Earle, 69,030 P-H
Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 152 (1969), failure to keep contemporaneous records was an
important factor in disallowance of the deduction.
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (1) (1962).
1970]
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incurred.' 9 Nevertheless, the "dairy" in Sanford was accepted by the Com-
missioner as sufficient. 20 The taxpayer lost in Sanford because he failed to
meet the second requirement of substantiation by documentary evidence in
the form of receipts or paid bills.21 These, in combination with the taxpay-
er's own records, must establish each element of the expenditure in order to
satisfy the adequate records requirement of the statute.22 The taxpayer's rec-
ords alone, being self-serving in nature, will no longer be sufficient as a basis
for claiming a deduction.23
It is important to note that the statute provides an alternative to the
adequate records requirement. In place of the documentary evidence neces-
sary for adequate records, the taxpayer may satisfy the substantiation re-
quirement by producing sufficient evidence to corroborate his own detailed
contemporaneous record relating to the elements of an expenditure.2 4 The
corroborative evidence necessary to satisfy the "sufficient evidence" re-
quirement has a variable meaning depending on what element of the
expenditure is to be established.25 Direct evidence, such as oral testimony
or a written statement by persons entertained, is sufficient corroboration to
establish cost, time, place, or date of the expenditure.2 6 However, circum-
stantial evidence is all that is necessary to corroborate the business purpose
and business relationship elements of an expenditure. 27 Absent the special
circumstances set forth in the regulations,28 a taxpayer who fails to fulfill
the "adequate records" or "sufficient evidence" requirement will have the
expenditure he claims as a deduction disallowed in full.2 9
Prior to Sanford it was widely believed that a well-kept personal record
19. William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823 (1968).
20. By the last sentence of § 274(d), Congress explicitly authorized the
Treasury to set a minimum amount below which the taxpayer need not corroborate
his own records. In accordance with this authority, the Treasury has set this figure
at $25. It is therefore important to the taxpayer to know how the $25 minimum
is figured for deduction purposes. Generally, each separate payment is considered
an expenditure in the $25 minimum. However, repetitive payments incurred as
part of a single event will be considered as an expenditure. For example, the total
cost, rather than the cost of each round of drinks at a cocktail lounge, is used to
figure the $25 minimum. See Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (6) (i) (a)& (b) (1962).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (2) (iii) (1962). William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823,
(1968); Robert H. Alter, 50 T.C. 833 (1968).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (2) (i) (1962). Cases cited note 21 supra.
23. John L. Ashby, 50 T.C. 409 (1968).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (3) (1962). William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823,(1968); Brown v. United States, 280 F; Supp. 854, 856 (D.N.M. 1967).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (3) (1962). Walter L. Woodward, 50 T.C. 982(1968).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5(c) (8) (1962). William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823(1968). Walter L. Woodward, supra note 25.
27. Brown v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 854, 856 (D.N.M. 1967); Walter L.
Woodward, 50 T.C. 982, (1968).
28. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c) (4), (5). The "special circumstances" found in
these regulations are: (1) the inherent nature of the expenditure making it impos-
sible for the taxpayer to obtain documentary evidence; (2) loss of records through
no fault of the taxpayer.
29. William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823 (1968).
[VCol. 35
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would be sufficient to substantiate expenses, in spite of the regulations.3 0
Now, however, the strict approach to substantiation of travel, entertain-
ment, and gift expenses that Congress intended in section 274 (d)31 and
that is exemplified in the Treasury Regulations32 has clearly been adopted
by the tax court in the Sanford decision. Thus, it is dear that the sub-
stantiation provisions of section 274(d) require documentary or other
sufficient evidence in addition to the taxpayer's personal record if he
claims travel, entertainment, and gift expenses as deductions"
RIcHARD J. AARoN
REPLEVIN-DEFENSE OF TITLE IN A THIRD PERSON
First National Bank of Clayton v. Trimco Metal Products Co.'
A replevin action was instituted by First National Bank of Clayton
against Trimco Metal Products Co. in circuit court. Trimco had executed
a promissory note to the bank which was secured by a chattel mortgage on
certain equipment with right of possession upon default. Trimco defaulted
in payment and the bank asserted its claim to the mortgaged equipment.
Trimco denied that it was the owner of the equipment and averred that
the bank had no right to possession because title to the property was in a
third person and the bank had knowledge of this fact when the note and
mortgage were executed. On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court, in hold-
ing for plaintiff, stated that even though plaintiff did not have legal title,
it would not be precluded from recovering from a defendant with an
inferior claim, if it could show a special property or interest in the equip-
ment. The execution of the chattel mortgage and note by Trimco created
such an interest, and gave plaintiff a right in the equipment superior to
that of Trimco. The court added, however, that this decision in no way
impaired the third person's rights against either the bank or Trimco.
To understand fully the propriety of the plea of title in a stranger or
the jus tertii defense asserted by defendant Trimco, it is necessary to con-
sider its use and scope at common law. At common law the doctrine of jus
tertii was not considered a valid defense to most forms of action. For ex-
ample, title in a third person has never been a defense in a suit for tres-
30. Sanford's lawyer advised him that documentary evidence was not needed
to support his "diary". The court indicates the lawyer's advice was based on the
conclusion that the regulations were invalid. Id. at 830.
31. H.R. REi'. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1962).
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5 (c). The court stated its position toward the regula-
tions in this manner: "Far from being contrary to the will of Congress, we think
the regulations under consideration reflect a faithful observance of the Congres-
sional intent." William F. Sanford, 50 T.C. 823, 832 (1968).
33. John L. Ashby, 50 T.C. 409 (1968).
1. 429 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1968).
1970]
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pass to either personal2 or real8 property. If D trespasses on land which is
in P's possession, D cannot defeat the action by showing that T owns the
land and that T could have compelled P to vacate. However, when D has
not merely trespassed but has also deprived P of possession, there is a split
of authority as to the validity of the jus tertii defense in a subsequent
action in ejectment.4 In trover 5 the defense of title in a third person is not
valid in most jurisdictions6 whether plaintiff gained possession under a
void transfer 7 or acquired possession wrongfully.8 In an action of detinue,9
where plaintiff has had prior possession, the defendant must connect him-
self with the outstanding title in order to assert the jus tertii defense.' 0 In
trespass on the case," the jus tertii defense has not been valid since the
1902 case of The Winkfield.' 2 In The Winkfield a bailee was permitted
to recover full damages from a third party tortfeasor notwithstanding title
in the bailor. Thus, with the possible exception of ejectment, none of the
2. New England Box Co. v. C. S. R. Constr. Co., 313 Mass. 696, 49 N.E.2d
121 (1943).
3. Hughes v. Graves, 39 Vt. 359 (1867).
4. Adams v. Orange Realty Sales, Inc., 134 Fla. 175, 183 So. 621 (1938);
Bertha v. Smith, 26 Tenn. App. 619, 175 S.W.2d 41 (1943), held that a defendant
in possession under color of title or right may prevail" by showing title in a third
person, notwithstanding that the third person is not a party to the action, nor con-
nected with defendant. In Urschel v. Davis, 125 Kan. 169, 263 P. 1074 (1928) the
defense of title in a third person was not permitted in an ejectment action.
However, even in those jurisdictions which permit the jus tertii defense to
defeat an ejectment action, three exceptions are recognized. In these cases the de-
fendant will have to connect himself with the outstanding title in order to defeat
plaintiff's action: a. where defendant has entered into possession under plaintiff.
Hall v. Dallas Joint-Stock Land Bank of Dallas, 95 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.
1936), reh. denied; b. where both parties claim title from a common source. Stock-
ton v. Murray, 183 Tenn. App. 371, 157 S.W.2d 859 (1941); c. where defendant is
a mere trespasser. Randolph v. Hinck, 288 Ill. 99, 123 N.E. 273 (1919); Walsh v.
Tipton, 183 Tenn. 28, 190 S.W.2d 294 (1945).
5. Trover is defined as: "A remedy to recover the value of personal chattels
wrongfully converted by another to his own use." BLAcK's LAW DicTiONARY 1679
(4th ed. 1951).
6. Buschow Lumber Co. v. Hines, 206 Mo. App. 681, 229 S.W. 451 (K.C.
Ct. App. 1921); Rosencranz v. Swofford Bros. Dry Goods Co., 175 Mo. 518, 75
S.W. 445 (1903). The minority view is set out in Barwick v. Barwick, 33 N.C. 80
(1850), which held that title in a third person is a valid defense to trover when
the plaintiff only has had prior possession.
7. Bustin v. Craven, 57 N.M. 724, 263 P.2d 392 (1953).
8. Anderson v. Gouldberg, 51 Minn. 294, 53 N.W. 636 (1892). But see Tur-
ley v. Tucker, 6 Mo. 583 (1840), which held that a trespasser or wrongdoer could
not maintain trover against another trespasser or wrongdoer.
9. Detinue is defined as: "A form of action which lies for the recovery, in
specie, of personal chattels from one who acquired possession of them lawfully,
but retains it without right, together with damages for the detention." Br Acx's LAw
DiCTIONARY 537 (4th ed. 1951).
10. Sims v. Boynton, 32 Ala. 353 (1858).
11. Trespass on the case is defined as: "The form of action, at common law,
adapted to the recovery of damages for some injury resulting to a party from the
wrongful act of another, unaccompanied by direct or immediate force, or which is
the indirect or secondary consequence of defendant's act." BLAcCs LAw DICToNARY
1675 (4th ed. 1951).
12. [1902] All E. R. 346.
[Vol. 35
5
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
RECENT CASES
common law writs discussed above have permitted the defense of title in a
third person.
One action at common law, that of replevin, could be defeated
by a showing of title in a third person. The reason replevin differed
from the other writs in this respect, is due to its origin and historical de-
velopment. Replevin was introduced at the end of the 12th Century as a
special remedy for an unlawful distress, 13 where trespass would not lie be-
cause the distrainor (person who took the goods) neither claimed nor
acquired the necessary interest in them, but conceded that the title re-
mained in the distrainee (person from whom the goods were taken).14
For example, a landlord who claimed rent in arrears, would take some cat-
tle of the tenant in order to satisfy the debt due him. In order to determine
the lawfulness of the taking the tenant would apply for a writ of replevin.
At trial, the only issue was whether there was a debt owing from the plaintiff
to the defendant. If there was a debt the plaintiff could keep the cattle. If
not, the tenant could have his cattle returned to him. If the defendant
asserted title to the property in himself or a third person' 5 the writ was
defeated and the tenant would have to bring trespass. This was due to the
fact that if defendant claimed title in himself or another, the taking
amounted to disseisin and not simply a distress. Hence, replevin was the
wrong remedy.16
The action of replevin, in effect, was a determination of whether a
debt was owing from the plaintiff to the defendant. This was the sole issue
to be litigated. Because of the limited scope of replevin, the defense of title
in a third person was permitted. As replevin developed in England, how-
ever, it was expanded until it was used to recover the possession of goods
whenever there was any wrongful taking.17 It was no longer limited to the
issue of whether a debt existed. Yet, when there was not a wrongful taking,
but simply a wrongful detention, replevin was still unavailable. In such a
situation, detinue was the proper remedy.' s The scope of replevin was ex-
panded even further in the United States to include not only a wrong-
ful taking but also a wrongful detention.' 9 In other words, the separate
common law actions of replevin and detinue were combined into one
action. In 1849, the writs of replevin and detinue were abolished by
13. A distress is defined as: "The taking a personal chattel out of the possession
of a wrongdoer into the custody of the party injured, to procure a satisfaction for
a wrong committed; as for non payment of rent .... . BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 561
(4th ed. 1951).
14. III W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWv, 284 (3d ed. rewritten
1927) [hereinafter cited as III HoLDsTvoTH].
15. A classic English case demonstrating the defense is Wildman v. North, 83
Eng. Rep. 465 (K.B. 1674), also reported as Wildman v. Norton, 86 Eng. Rep. 167(K. B. 1674). In the second report, the case is stated as containing a plea by the de-
fendant of property in himself. In the first report the plea is of property in a third
person. Apparently no distinction was drawn between these two pleas.
16. III HoLDSwoRTH 284.
17. VII W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw, 414 (2d ed. 1937).
18. III HoLswoRTH, 287; T. PLuCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COM-
MON LAW 364 (5th ed. 1956); F. MAnrLAND, THE Fopsvs OF ACTION AT COmmoN
LAw 62 (1941).
19. T. PLUcKNETr, supra note 18, at 369.
1970)
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statute20 in Missouri, but the substantive law covering these two actions was
incorporated into a "Claim and Delivery Statute."21
Owing to the expansion of the action of replevin, the reason which
originally justified the defense of title in a third party, i.e., to determine
whether plaintiff's title would take the case outside the scope of replevin
and place it within the scope of trespass, no longer exists. Replevin is no
longer concerned solely with the debt owing from -the plaintiff to the de-
fendant, but it depends, as in the case of trespass, upon the relative posses-
sory rights of the parties. The party who can prove a superior possessory in-
terest in the property should be allowed to prevail. Otherwise, a wrongdoing
defendant, who cannot justify his acts upon his own right, would be able
to secure immunity because the plaintiff's claim, though better than his
own, may be inferior to some third party's. This reasoning is followed by
most courts in this country.22 Yet, some courts persist in following the
anachronistic doctrine of permitting title in a third person to be a valid
defense. 23 These courts hold that regardless of the possessory rights between
the parties, the defendant may defeat the replevin by proving that some
third party has a right to possession superior either to himself or to the
plaintiff.
The early Missouri cases which considered the jus tertii defense in a
replevin action seemed to adopt the arbitrary approach of the early com-
mon law. In Jackson v. City of Columbia,24 the city seized a carload of
whiskey from Jackson, a bailee of the owner. In a replevin action by Jackson
against the city for return of the whiskey, the city was permitted to defend
by showing that title to the whiskey was in a third person.25 In the earlier
case of Baker v. Campbell,26 a replevin action for timber wrongfully cut
20. Mo. Laws 1849, at 73, § 1.
21. The first statutes covering claim and delivery of personal property after
the abolition of the old forms of action were Mo. Laws 1849, at 82, §§ 1-9.
22. See Annot., 25 A. 8: E. CAs. 20 (1912).
23. See, e.g., Boyd v. White Motor Credit Co., 208 So.2d 757 (Miss. 1968);
Marlin v. Merrill, 25 Tenn. App. 328, 156 S.W.2d 814 (1941); State ex rel. Hayashi
v. Ronald, 134 Wash. 152, 235 P. 21 (1925); Hitch v. Riggin, 26 Del. 84, 80 A. 975
(1911); Fuller v. Brownell, 48 Neb. 145, 67 N.W. 6 (1896).
Allowing the defense of title in a 3rd person also still seems to be the law
in England. Presgrave v. Saunders, 92 Eng. Rep. 156 (1703); Clarke v. Davies, 129
Eng. Rep. 29 (1816). The English court, in Butcher v. Porter, 91 Eng. Rep. 87 (K.B.
1692), indicated its disapproval of the defense. The court held that title in a third
person was a valid defense; however, an editorial note following the case stated:
Though this case appears to be established law, it does not seem
founded on very accurate reasoning. For the plaintiff, being in possession
of the goods at the time of the caption by the defendant, may be con-
sidered as having a right against all persons but the actual owner; and it
has not much semblance of justice that A should seize upon goods which
are in the possession of B and justify that seizure by a title in a perfect
stranger.
24. 217 S.W. 869 (K.C. Mo. App. 1920). See 20 COLUm. L. REv. 622 (1920)
for a criticism of the case.
25. It should be pointed out that Jackson was in illegal possession of the
whiskey in the city of Columbia, and the courts are not apt to aid a person in
violating the law. Although the proper result was reached, the court should not
have used the doctrine of jus tertii to justify its decision.
26. 82 Mo. App. 529 (K.C. Ct. App. 1888).
[Vol. 35
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was defeated by showing that the title and right to possession were not in
the plaintiff, but in his wife. This defense was allowed even though plain-
tiff was in possession of the premises at the time of the cutting.27
The Missouri cases gradually departed from the early common law
approach, and today the rule, as demonstrated in Trimco, is that the de-
fense of title in a third person will not defeat an action in replevin.28
The first indication of a departure from the former rule was in Campbell
v. Brown," a case decided ten years prior to Jackson. In Brown, the plain-
tiff occupied a newly formed island in the Mississippi River between Mis-
souri and Tennessee which had not been included in any federal or state
survey. Plaintiff cultivated it and erected several buildings. The defendant
tortiously removed a barge-load of sand from the island, whereupon the
plaintiff sued in replevin for its return or the value thereof. The court held
for plaintiff, basing its decision on the plaintiff's prior possession of the
island. Although this case did not involve the defense of title in a third
person, it did establish precedent for the proposition that mere prior pos-
session is sufficient to sustain an action in replevin, thereby permitting title
to be in someone other than the plaintiff. Here, the court simply looked
at the relative rights of the plaintiff and defendant. The Browns0 decision,
incidentally, was never mentioned in Jackson.3 1
Rankin v. Wyatt,3 2 a 1934 case, cited as the controlling authority in
Trimco, established the rule in Missouri that a replevin action cannot be
defeated by setting up title in a third person. The Rankin Court held that
one rightfully in possession of an automobile, but without title because of
failure to obtain an assignment of the title certificate as required by statute,
could maintain replevin against a trespasser. In this connection, the court
stated:
The fact that a third person may have some interest in the
property will not preclude replevin by one having the right to
possession as against the defendant sued. As the right of a defend-
ant to retain the property descends the scale of relative rights of
27. In Campbell, there seems to have been little justification for allowing the
defense, since the proper result was not reached as it had been in Jackson. See note
26, supra.
A number of other Missouri cases reiterate the same doctrine: American
Metal Co. v. Daugherty, 204 Mo. 71, 102 S.W. 538 (1907); Draper v. Farris, 56
Mo. App. 417 (St. L. Ct. App. 1894); Stone v. McNealy, 59 Mo. App. 396 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1894); Gartside v. Nixon, 43 Mo. 138 (1868); Gray v. Parker, 38 Mo. 160
(1866); Broadwater v. Dame, 10 Mo. 277 (1847). However, these cases which held
that bare possession is not sufficient to support an action in replevin did not direct-
ly involve the defense of title in a third person. See generally Annot., 150 A.L.R.
163, 193 (1944).
28. Where a chattel is owned by several persons, the owner of an undivided
interest cannot maintain replevin for the chattel without joining the other owners
as plaintiffs. Thus, the defendant in such a suit could use the jus tertii defense
if the other owners were not joined. See 17 Mo. L. R.v. 107, 109 (1952).
29. 146 Mo. App. 319, 130 S.W. 50 (Spr. Ct. App. 1910).
30. Ibid.
31. Jackson v. City of Columbia, 217 S.W. 869 (K.C. Mo. App. 1920).
32. 335 Mo. 628, 73 S.W.2d 764 (1934). Accord, Pearl v. Interstate Sec. Co.,
357 Mo. 160, 206 S.W.2d 975 (1947).
1970]
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possession to the vanishing point of a wrongful detention by a
trespasser, the interest sufficient to sustain plaintiff's action in
replevin diminishes.38
In conclusion, it is submitted that those jurisdictions which have not
done so, should set aside the jus tertii defense as an anachronism that is no
longer useful, and follow the approach demonstrated by Rankin and Trimco
which does not permit a defendant to defeat a replevin action by setting
up title in a third person. The reason which once justified the jus tertii
defense in replevin no longer exists, and there is no reason why replevin
should be treated differently than common law trespass, trover, or detinue.
The courts should focus on the relative rights of the parties to the litiga-
tion and not upon the rights of a third party stranger.
IRWIN E. BLOND
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PHYSICIANS FOR NEGLIGENT
TREATMENT BY OTHER PHYSICIANS
Crump v. Piper1
Plaintiff Crump had a history of back trouble, having had one
laminectomy at the L4-L5 interspace in 1957, and another such operation
in 1959. Still suffering from persistent severe pains in his lower back due,
in part, to only partial recovery from the first two operations, Crump con-
sulted Dr. Pucci, a neurosurgeon specializing in the excision of spinal discs,
one of the defendants. Plaintiff, in discussing his condition with Dr. Pucci,
suggested that if another operation was necessary he thought a fusion of
the vertebrae should be done. Dr. Pucci then suggested that Dr. Piper, an
orthopedic surgeon specializing in the fusion of vertebrae and co-defend-
ant herein, be called in for consultation in connection with a fusion of the
L4 and L5 vertebrae. Dr. Piper was brought into the case and the two doc-
tors agreed, after consultation, that another laminectomy and also a stabili-
zation of the affected area by a fusion of the L4 and L5 vertebrae was re-
quired. Plaintiff was advised of this and agreed to the surgery.
The operation was performed in the following manner. Dr. Pucci
opened plaintiff's back and proceeded with the laminectomy facet of the
operation, removing the offending disc fragment next to the L4 nerve root.
When this part of the operation was finished, Dr. Piper took over and pro-
ceeded to practice his specialty by effecting a fusion of the L4 and L5 verte-
brae. Dr. Piper was Dr. Pucci's assistant during the first (laminectomy) part
of the operation performed by Dr. Pucci and Dr. Piper was assisted by Dr.
Pucci in the second part of the operation when the vertebrae were fused.
However, Dr. Pucci left the operating room to attend to other business
33. Rankin v. Wyatt, 835 Mo. 628, 634, 73 S.W.2d 764, 767 (1934).
1. 425 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. 1968).
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prior to the time that the wound was dosed by Dr. Piper. Cottonoid sponges
were not used in the laminectomy portion of the operation performed by
Dr. Pucci, but such sponges were used in the fusion portion of the operation
performed by Dr. Piper. One of these sponges remained inside plaintiff's
back when Dr. Piper dosed up the wound.
Plaintiff brought suit against Dr. Pucci and Dr. Piper for $250,000 for
damages resulting from failure to remove the cottonoid sponge. Following
a jury verdict and a judgment in favor of both defendants, the trial court
entered an order granting plaintiff a new trial on the grounds that the
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Defendants appealed and
the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order. The specific
act of negligence charged was the leaving of the cottonoid sponge in the
plaintiff's body. Assuming without deciding that there is sufficient evidence
to warrant a finding of primary negligence on the part of Dr. Piper,2 the
discussion in this article will focus solely on the treatment of the case by
the supreme court when it found Dr. Pucci vicariously liable for the negli-
gent omissions of Dr. Piper.
The court rejected the contentions of the defendants that they were
each independent contractors, each engaged for a specific part of the opera-
tion, and that each was responsible for his own negligence in that part of
the operation performed by him and no more. The court relied heavily on
American Law Reports Annotated, Second Series and American Juris-
prudence as the foundation for its decision in the Crump case.8 These two
sources are not completely instructive in solving the problems in Crump,
however. Therefore, it is necessary to review the underlying cases which are
used to support the statements found therein in an effort to see which, if
any, of the promulgated "maxims" apply to the Crump situation.
There are three Missouri decisions on medical malpractice which are
helpful in shedding light on the Missouri attitude toward situations analo-
gous to the one in the noted case. In Gross v. Robinson,4 the court was
presented with a situation in which a patient with a fractured rib went to
D-1 for X-rays in preparation for a lawsuit. D-1 made several unsuccessful
attempts to obtain adequate X-rays when finally, in the presence of the
patient, D-1 called D-2 over the telephone, explained the situation and re-
quested D-2 to come over and take the pictures with D-1's machine. D-2
came over, but he too was unsuccessful as were subsequent attempts by D-1.
In a suit by the patient against D-1 for being overexposed to the X-ray treat-
2. For different approaches taken by the cases in the establishing of primary
negligence in cases similar to Crump, see Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P.2d 409
(1936); Blackburn v. Baker, 237 N.Y.S. 611, 227 App. Div. 588 (1929); Brown v.
Bennett, 157 Mich. 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909); Olander v. Johnson, 258 Ill. App.
89 (1930); Hall v. Grosvenor, 267 Ill. App. 119 (1932); Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243
Ore. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966); Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949, 41 S.E. 78 (1902):
Jett v. Linvetle, 202 Ky. 148, 259 S.W. 48 (1924); Rhodes v. Lamar, 145 Okla.
223, 292 P. 335 (1930).
3. 85 A.L.R. 2d 889, 898 (1962), 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons § 113
(1942). See also 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons § 54c (1951). But see 41 Am. Jur.
Physicians and Surgeons §§ 112, 114 (1942) and 70 C.J.S. Physicians and Surgeons
§ 54 (1951).
4. 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W. 924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
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ments, the court talked of the liability of D-1 for D-2's acts. Although find-
ing D-i primarily negligent on the grounds that continued exposures with
knowledge of what D-2 had done amounted to an adoption of D-2's conduct,
the court had this to say by way of dictum:
It seems that the relation of master and servant, or principal
and agent does not exist between two physician [sic] where one has
been sent to treat the patient of the other with the consent of the
patient. In such instance the rule of respondeat superior does not
apply.
The idea running through these cases is that the rule does not
apply 'to a physician or other professional man who, when em-
ployed, acts upon his own initiative and without direction from
others.'5
Telanus v. Simpson6 was regarded by the court in the Crump case as
clearly inapplicable due to the fact that the case involved liability of two
doctors who were partners. It is nevertheless significant because it represents
an adoption by Missouri of the view that where two doctors are employed
on the same case involving an operation, the two of them may agree to
divide the services to be performed during the operation according to their
best judgment and yet retain their status as independent contractors, each
responsible for his own negligence and no more.7
Baird v. National Health Foundations was regarded by the court as
authoritative in its disposition of the Crump case. In Baird, a hospital had
a contract by which it would give people medical services if they were
members of the defendant National Health Foundation. Plaintiff was a
member of the Foundation and, upon being taken ill, took advantage of the
contract which entitled her to employ one of the three defendant doctors
as a medical director who alone could furnish her medical services. The de-
fendant director (D-i) was authorized to and did employ two other phy-
sicians to assist him (D-2 and D-3). Each of the doctors had the same office
and phone number as the Foundation and each was paid by the Founda-
tion. D-i examined and treated plaintiff when she first came to the Founda-
tion complaining of an illness. She got worse and asked D-1 to make a house
call, but D-2 went instead and prescribed a different medicine for her with-
out having examined her first. Plaintiff again got worse and this time D-3
made the house call, examined her and prescribed treatment. Plaintiff
ultimately sued the three doctors and the Foundation for negligently failing
to discover her condition. The court found the three doctors liable for their
neglect of duty to care for the welfare of their patient stressing the facts that
they were all employed by the same Foundation for the purpose of treating
plaintiff, that they were all associated in the same office and that each had
knowledge of what the others had done and was doing. The court found
5. 203 Mo. App. at 122, 218 S.W. at 926 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920) (emphasis
supplied). See also; Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Simmons
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P.2d 609 (1938).
6. 321 Mo. 724, 12 S.W.2d 920 (1928).
7. Accord, Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912).
8. 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940).
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that each doctor was negligent, independent of the other and that they
were acting concurrently with the result that all were jointly and severally
liable for whatever damage plaintiff suffered. The case was apparently
cited in the Crump opinion for the proposition that when two or more
doctors act concurrently and for a joint purpose that each is liable for the
negligent acts and omissions of the other. It is the opinion of this writer,
however, that this is an overly broad application of that case and that
Baird merely represents the application of the "adoption" doctrine found
in Gross v. Robinson, supra.
Missouri has adopted the prevalent attitude that, in most situations, a
physician is to be treated as an independent contractor because the nature
of his profession is to exercise his best skill and judgment in diagnosing and
treating diseases and injuries without being subject to the control of others.9
As an extension of this rule, it has been held that when one physician re-
fers a patient to another competent physician, the referring physician is
not liable for the negligence of the referred physician, absent a partnership,
agency, or a master-servant relationship.1 It is widely recognized by the
courts that where there is a medical partnership each physician-member is
liable for the negligence of his fellow physician-members."
Liability based on a finding of agency or of a master-servant relation-
ship, however, has generated much confusion. In Gross v. Robinson,'2 for
instance, the court said that a physician is not to be regarded as an agent or
servant in the usual sense because his profession demands that he be free
from the control of those who pay his fees. Yet, in Baird v. National Foun-
dation,13 the court in its holding that the Foundation was chargeable with
the negligent treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant physicians, focused
on the facts that the defendant doctors were employed and paid by the
defendant Foundation and that they all shared the same office and phone
numbers. There was no suggestion, however, that the Foundation exercised
control over defendant doctors, nor that the Foundation was negligent in
employing them. The liability of the Foundation was based soley on the
fact of employment. It thus appears that Missouri will focus on who signs
the paycheck in situations involving vicarious liability of an entity (the
Foundation) for the negligence of a physician, whereas the focus will be on
9. Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W. 924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920);
Telanus v. Simpson, 321 Mo. 724, 12 S.W.2d 920 (1928); Baird v. National Health
Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850 (K.C. Ct. App. 1940).
10. Graddy v. New York Medical College, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (1963); Nelson
v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926); Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App.
345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Mayer v. Hipke, 183 Wis. 382, 197 N.W. 333 (1924).
11. Stephens v. Williams, 226 Ala. 584, 147 So. 608 (1933); Simmons v. North-
ern Pac. Ry. Co., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P.2d 609 (1933); Wemsett v. Mount, 134 Ore.
305, 292 P. 93 (1930); See also § 358.130 RSMo 1959. See Graddy v. New York Medi-
cal College, 243 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (1963), where two physicians who shared the same
office, secretary, professional equipment and office supplies had an agreement
whereby each agreed to service the other's patients in his absence for a shared fee.
Held, no partnership and therefore no vicarious liability.
12. Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W. 924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
13. Baird v. National Health Foundation, 235 Mo. App. 594, 144 S.W.2d 850
(K.C. Ct. App. 1940).
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control where a master servant relationship between two physicians is sought
as the basis for finding vicarious liability.' 4
With respect to situations involving an attempt to hold one physician
liable for the negligence of another, the general rule is that each are inde-
pendent contractors,' 5 each answerable for his own negligence or the negli-
gence of the other which he observed or, in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence, should have observed.' 6 A careful reading of this statement, however,
would disclose that one is only liable for his own negligence. For, if one
physician observes another physician being negligent and yet does nothing,
then he can be said to have adopted the other's conduct through his own
negligence in failing to object. Implicit in the statement is a recognition of
a duty on the part of the one physician to object to the negligent acts or
omissions of another physician which he observed or, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have observed, followed by a breach of that
duty. Thus, the question is really one of primary negligence and not of vi-
carious responsibility, a distinction which many overlook.' 7 This becomes
all the more apparent when we look to the- "or, in the exercise of reason-
able diligence, should have observed"-aspect of the above rule. In the cases
which discuss this rule, it is often pointed out that the one physician is not
liable for the negligence of the second physician when the negligent act
was not done in the presence of the first physician.' 8 This indicates that a
physician's duty to object to negligence which he should have observed
does not exist if he is absent, and inferentially, that this duty does not re-
quire him to be present.' 9 To be sure, a physician can be held liable for
negligently abandoning his patient, but this too presupposes an initial duty
on the part of the physician to be present and a breach of that duty. Again,
breach of the duty to be present would be primary negligence and not a
situation involving vicarious responsibility.
Several courts, in cases involving participation of more than one phy-
sician in connection with the patient's case, focus on the "contractual rela-
tionship between the patient and each of the doctors. An example is Wiley
v. Wharton,20 involving a situation in which the plaintiff patient en-
gaged a Dr. Wharton to operate on her, and Dr. Wharton in turn engaged
14. Where one physician temporarily employs another physician, this alone
does not render the employing physician liable for the negligence of the employed
physicians. Heimlich v. Harvey, 155 Wis. 471, 39 N.W.2d 394 (1949); Moulton v.
Huckleberry, 150 Ore. 538, 46 P.2d 589 (1935).
15. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Wiley v. Wharton,
68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d
797 (1966).
16. Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich. 562, 262 N.W. 409 (1935); Wabeke v.
Bull, 289 Mich. 551, 286 N.W. 825 (1939); Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345,
41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Morey v. Thybo, 199 F. 760 (7th Cir. 1912); Nelson v. San-
dell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926).
17. 85 A.L.R.2d 889; 41 Am. Jur. Physicians and Surgeons; 70 C.J.S. Phy-
sicians and Surgeons; note 3 supra.
18. Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich. 562, 262 N.W. 409 (1935); Graddy v. New
York Medical College, 243 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1963); Wabeke v. Bull, 289 Mich. 551,
286 N.W. 825 (1939).
19. Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912).
20. Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.W.2d 255 (1941).
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a Dr. Michaels to administer the anaesthetic. Dr. Michaels, in the absence of
Dr. Wharton, prepared the patient for the operation by administering the
anaesthetic and while doing so negligently broke a needle, leaving it im-
bedded in the patient's spine. In holding that Dr. Wharton was not re-
sponsible for Dr. Michael's negligence, the court said:
Dr. Wharton and the plaintiff entered originally into a con-
sensual contract. At the time, the parties understood that Dr.
Wharton was not to administer the anaesthetic but was to perform
the abdominal operation, Dr. Wharton suggested that Dr. Michaels
be engaged. No objection was interposed by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff accepted the services of Dr. Michaels, and although Dr.
Wharton actually engaged Dr. Michaels, nevertheless there was
created betveen the plaintiff and Dr. Michaels a separate con-
tract by implication. Under these circumstances each doctor was
engaged to perform his separate and distinct work, independent
of the other.2 1.
Thus we have the idea that where two physicians are involved in the case,
it does not matter how the second physician came into the case, whether
by being contracted by the patient independent of the first physician or
whether he is brought in by the second physician. What does matter is that
the patient understands that each physician is to perform separate and
distinct work, and that the patient consents to this arrangement. 22 More-
over, consent may either be expressed or implied by the circumstances. 23
As a by-product of this approach, there are holdings that when a physi-
cian merely arranges for an operation by another physician and lends casual
assistance at the operation, he is not jointly liable for the negligence of the
operating physician absent some relationship of partnership or employ-
ment.
24
The law becomes very confused, however, when one encounters state-
ments in the cases to the effect that there is joint liability when negligently
inflicted damage results from an operation which is actually performed
by two doctors or when two doctors act in concert.25 Here the dividing line
between two doctors acting independently and two doctors acting jointly
or in concert seems to depend on whether the direction and control of the
operations are in one man.26 If so, there will be no joint or concerted per-
21. Wiley v. Wharton, supra, note 20, at 350, 41 N.W. at 258 (emphasis sup.
plied).
22. Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912); Nelson v. Sandell, 202
Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926); Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W.
924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920); Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911).
23. Wiley v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941); Morey v.
Thybo, 199 F. 760 (7th Cir. 1912); Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218
S.W. 924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920).
24. Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
25. Brown v. Bennett, 157 Mich. 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909); 85 A.L.R. 2d
889, 893; Conrad v. Lakewood General Hospital, 67 Wash. 2d 934, 410 P.2d 785
(1966); Graddy v. New York Medical College, 248 N.Y.S. 2d 940 (1963); Wemmett
v. Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 292 P. 93 (1930); Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich. 562, 262
N.W. 409 (1935); Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966); Wiley
v. Wharton, 68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E. 2d 255 (1941).
26. Brown v. Bennett, 157 Mich 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909); Nelson v. Sandell,
202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926).
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formance of the operation.27 The mere fact that a physician assisted in the
operation is not enough to render him jointly liable.28
Crump v. Piper is the first case which has applied the above principles
to the modern practice of specialization in various areas of surgical treat-
ments. As mentioned previously, this case involves the performance of two
operations: a laminectomy and a fusion of vertebrae, each part being per-
formed by a specialist in the appropriate field, both specialties being per-
formed separately but being combined into one operation. The court was
not without guidance, however, for there are decisions which at least indi-
cate that where one physician calls in a specialist, he is not liable for the
latter's negligence even if he assists the specialist,29 at least in the absence
of concerted action. 0 Nevertheless, the Crump court said:
[It] reasonably may be inferred from the evidence that de-
fendants were employed jointly not independently, to treat plain-
tiff jointly for the relief of his condition, according to their best
judgment. They diagnosed his condition together and reached
the same conclusion. They both recommended a laminectomy and
fusion of vertebrae in one operation. Although each, in serving
with the other, performed that part of the surgery for which his
talents particularly qualified him....
We hold that under the facts of this case the two defendants
were not independent contractors .... 1
Moreover, the fact that Dr. Pucci had left the operating room and was not
present when the negligent omission of Dr. Piper occurred did not relieve
Dr. Pucci of vicarious liability.
What, then, is the current status of the Missouri law on medical mal-
practice based on the concept of vicarious liability? The court did not hold
that Dr. Pucci was under a duty to remain in the operating room until Dr.
Piper had finished the fusion, nor did it adopt the outlook in those cases
that hold that whoever participates in an operation and is present when
sponges are put into a patient's body has a duty to see that they are re-
moved. Dr. Pucci was not held primarily negligent but vicariously responsi-
ble. Nor does the court seem to recognize those cases which hold that one
27. Brown v. Bennett, 157 Mich. 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909).
28. Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala. 194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Nelson v. Sandell,
202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926); Morey v. Thybo, 199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912);
Brown v. Bennett, 157 Mich. 654, 122 N.W. 305 (1909). But see, Conrad v. Lake-
wood General Hospital, 67 Wash. 2d 934, 410 P.2d 785 (1966), where the court
found joint liability. The theory was that whoever participates in an operation has
the duty to make certain that all instruments be removed from the patient's body.
Both doctors breached that duty and so both were negligent. Mitchell v. Saunders,
219 N.C. 178, 13 S.E.2d 242 (1941), held that whoever assists in actually placing
a sponge in the patient's body during an operation is charged with the duty to re-
move it. Failure to remove sponges renders all the assisting doctors liable for negli-
gence.
29. Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966); Myers v. Holborn,
58 N.J.L. 193, 33 A. 389 (1895); Gray v. McLaughin, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S.W.2d 686
(1944), Runyan v. Goodrum, 147 Ark. 481, 228 S.W. 397 (1921).
30. Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d 797 (1966).
31. 425 S.W.2d 924, 928 (Mo. 1968).
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doctor is not vicariously liable for the negligent acts or omissions of another
done in his absence. This seems to put physicians like Dr. Pucci in the
position of being insurers; for while they have no duty to remain until the
other specialist, then in control of and performing the operation, is fin-
ished, nevertheless they are vicariously responsible for negligence done in
their absence. This is indeed an odd situation.
Most troublesome in the Crump decision, however, are the court's
findings that Doctor Piper and Pucci were "jointly employed" and that
they treated the patient "jointly". This finding of "joint employment"
seems to disregard those cases which have applied the "independently em-
ployed" concept. Here, Dr. Pucci was engaged first and Dr. Piper was
brought into the case upon Dr. Pucci's suggestion, which was consented
to by plaintiff. Dr. Pucci was to perform one service, a laminectomy, and
Dr. Piper was to perform another service, the fusion. Not only was this
division of service known by and consented to by the plaintiff, but that is
the very reason for the bringing of Dr. Piper into the case in the first place.
At this point it should be remembered that it was the plaintiff himself who
suggested that if another operation was necessary then he thought a fusion
should be performed. It is here that the court's crucial finding that the two
doctors were employed jointly, not independently, completely disregards
not only the distinctions between the two concepts but established prece-
dent as well.32 The court based its finding that the two doctors acted
jointly, not independently, on the fact that they acted in concert to accom-
plish a common goal-the correction of the defect in plaintiff's back. It
would be more proper, however, to say that they acted "concurrently" and
not "in concert" for by the very facts of the case each was a specialist and
each assisted in that part of the operation performed by the other. Each was
in control of that part of the operation which he performed while the other
assisted, and at no time did they both act jointly in performing the opera-
tion. By the very facts of the case, when Dr. Pucci finished performing the
laminectomy, "Dr. Piper took over for a fusion. ... 33 Missouri therefore
seems to equate independently employed and concurrently acting with
being jointly employed and jointly acting. Clearly, prior cases would not
support such a confusion of heretofore carefully developed concepts. 34
It seems that the Missouri Supreme Court has, sub silentio, not only
rejected the attitudes expressed in Gross v. Robinson and Telanus v. Simp-
son,35 but has overapplied the Baird case.3 6 As a result, it has separated
itself not only from its own prior indications of policy, but also from the
precedents developed in many other states. The resultant Missouri test for
32. See notes 20-24 supra and related text.
33. 425 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Mo. 1968) (emphasis supplied).
34. Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926); Morey v. Thybo,
199 F. 760 (7th Cir. 1912); Sprinkle v. Lemley, 243 Ore. 521, 414 P.2d (1966);
Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich. 562, 262 N.W. 409 (1935); Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d
82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); Telaneus v. Simpson, 321 Mo. 724, 12 S.W.2d 920 (1928);
Gross v. Robinson, 203 Mo. App. 118, 218 S.W. 924 (K.C. Ct. App. 1920); McCon-
nell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949); Robinson v. Crotwell, 175 Ala.
194, 57 So. 23 (1911); Smith v. Beard, 56 Wyo. 375, 110 P.2d 260 (1941).
35. See notes 4 to 6 supra and related text.
36. See note 8 supra and related text.
1970]
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/10
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
joint employment-joint activity as opposed to independently employed and
acting concurrently seems to be that if two physicians act together towards
a common goal-i.e., the correction of a defect or disease of the patient-
they are vicariously responsible regardless of the fact that they do not
participate together with respect to the same aspect of that defect or disease.
Emphasis has shifted so that the focus is now on this broadly defined goal.
It takes little effort for one to imagine many situations both in the area of
the physician and surgeon and in the area of independent contractors in
general in which an application of this test would produce unsatisfactory
results.
J. WILLIAM CAMPBELL
MUNICIPAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE CITIES
-STATUTE IMPOSING DUTY ON MAYOR TO APPOINT
FIREMEN'S ARBITRATION BOARD IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
State ex -el. Burke v. Cervantes1
A dispute arose concerning wages and conditions of employment be-
tween members of the Fire Department of St. Louis and Mayor Cervantes.
The firemen requested that the Mayor select an arbitration board to resolve
the dispute pursuant to the Firemen's Arbitration Board Act, enacted in
1963.2 This statute provides that members of a paid fire department may re-
quest the chief executive of any city, town or other governmental unit to ap-
point an arbitration board to hear their disputes and make recommenda-
tions. The Mayor refused to select an arbitration board and the firemen
brought a class action in mandamus to compel him to do so. The trial
court granted mandamus and the Mayor appealed. The Supreme Court
of Missouri reversed, holding that the statute is unconstitutional and void
as applied to constitutional charter cities under article VI, section 22 of
the Missouri Constitution of 1945, which provides:
No law shall be enacted creating or fixing the powers, duties,
or compensation of any municipal office or employment, for a
city framing or adopting its own charter under this or any previous
constitution....
In support of their position, the firemen cited the majority rule that
legislation concerning municipal fire departments is a matter of state-wide
concern and that general statutes on the subject apply to home rule mu-
nicipalities.3 The court recognized this to be the rule, but found that the
1. 423 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. 1968).
2. §§ 290.350-.380, RSMo 1967 Supp.
3. Luhrs v. Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 438, 83 P.2d 283 (1938); People ex rel. Moshier
v. Springfield, 370 Ill. 541, 19 N.E.2d 598 (1939); State ex tel. Benson v. Peterson,
180 Minn. 366, 230 N.W. 830 (1930); Axberg v. Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613(1942); State ex rel. Giovanello v. Lowellville, 139 Ohio St. 219, 39 N.E.2d 527
(1942); Hamilton v. Charleston, 116 W. Va. 521, 182 S.E. 575 (1935); Barth v.
Shorewood, 229 Wis. 151, 282 N.W. 89 (1938).
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rule applied only to municipal-state conflicts, and not to constitutional-
statutory conflicts. It was noted that state statutes may supersede charter
provisions, but may not supersede the Missouri Constitution nor impose
duties and obligations forbidden by the constitution.4 The court reasoned
that the Firemen's Arbitration Board Act fixed a mandatory duty on the
Mayor to appoint an arbitration board and concluded that the imposition
of such a duty directly violated article VI, section 22 by "fixing the powers
and duties" of the office of Mayor of St. Louis.5
In the absence of state constitutional provision, municipalities have
no inherent right of self-government 6 and are merely convenient agencies
for exercising such governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted
to them.7 Missouri was the first state which attempted to change this situa-
tion by constitutional provision. The 1875 Constitution conferred upon
certain municipalities the authority to govern their own affairs by a home
rule charter, "consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of
the state. . .
Although there is some uncertainty as to the scope of power which
home rule cities derive from this constitutional grant,9 the Missouri Su-
preme Court decided early that the provision did not prevent the General
Assembly from creating and fixing the powers of municipal officers and
employees. In State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason,'0 the 1899 St. Louis Police Act
was considered in a mandamus proceeding. The Police Act prescribed the
number of St. Louis policemen, their qualifications, and salaries, and the
method of removing them from the force. In upholding the Act's constitu-
tionality, the Missouri Supreme Court stated, "The fact that St. Louis is
organized under a constitutional freeholders' charter does not affect the
question... [of whether the city] has the right to substitute its own police
system for that of the state."" Mason firmly established the proposition that
4. State ex rel. Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. 1968).
5. Id. at 794.
6. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262
U.S. 182 (1923).
7. Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 575 (1964). See Kansas City v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 337 Mo. 913,
87 S.W.2d 195 (En Banc 1935); Donovan v. Kansas City, 352 Mo. 430, 175 S.W.2d
874 (En Banc 1943), appeal dismissed, 322 U.S. 707 (1944); Kansas City v. Frogge,
352 Mo. 233, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206
S.W.2d 539 (En Banc 1947); St. Louis v. Sommers, 346 Mo. 700, 266 S.W.2d 753
(1954).
8. Mo. CONsT. art IX, § 16 (1875) provided:
Any city having a population of more than one hundred thousand in-
habitants may frame and adopt a charter for its own government, consistent
with and subject to the Constitution and laws of the State....
Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19 does not modify this basic grant, except to lower
the population requirement to 10,000.
9. For discussion of home rule as a legal concept and the experience in Mis-
souri see Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Ex-
perience, 33 Mo. L. Rav. 45 (1968); Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri,
53 WASH. U.L.Q. 385 (1953).
10. 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524 (En Banc 1899).
11. Id. at 58, 54 S.W. at 534.
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the General Assembly retains the power to create city offices despite the
constitution's home rule grant.1 2
The practical inconvenience the Mason doctrine caused home rule
cities can best be illustrated by example. Kansas City's charter provided
for a city Commissioner of Licenses to be appointed under the city merit
system with a stipulated salary to be provided by city ordinance. A 1901
state statute, on the other hand, provided for the general election of a
License Collector in cities having a population of more than 300,000.13 The
statute prescribed the powers, duties, and compensation of the office. When
enacted only St. Louis had a population of 300,000. By 1920 Kansas City
also had a 300,000 population and thereafter the city was forced to appoint
the winner of the License Collector general election to the position of city
Commissioner of Licenses. To complicate matters further, Kansas City ordi-
nances provided for a smaller salary than the salary prescribed by state
statute.1
4
Litigation eventually arose concerning the legality of the statutory
office of License Collector as against the charter office of License Com-
missioner. In Coleman v. Kansas City1 5 the Missouri Supreme Court rou-
tinely noted that "[t]hroughout the state's existence the General Assembly
has enacted statutes regulating cities, creating city offices and prescribing
duties thereof.".1 6 The supreme court concluded that the statutory office
of License Collector was the legal office, the statutes being superior to the
city charter.
The Coleman case was decided on July 3, 1944 while the Constitutional
Convention of Missouri of 194344 was in session. Immediately after the
decision the entire matter of the statutory creation and control of municipal
offices in charter cities was presented to the Constitutional Convention. 17
On July 25, 1944, Delegate Allen, at the request of the City Council and
Mayor of Kansas City, after reciting the history of the Coleman case,18 pro-
posed what was to become article VI, section 22 of the 1945 Constitution
of Missouri. Delegate Allen's proposal was that "[njo municipal office
shall be created by the General Assembly... [for constitutional home rule
cities] nor shall the General Assembly fix the powers, duties, or compen-
12. See State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost, 265 Mo. 51, 175 S.W. 591 (En Banc
1915), concerning the statutory creation of the Kansas City Police System; and
Stemmler v. Einstein, 297 S.W.2d 467, 472 (Mo. En Banc 1956), containing dictum
that the 1945 Constitution had no effect on the validity of Mason.
13. §§ 82.310-.410, RSMo 1959.
14. DF-BATES OF TaE MissouRI CoNsrrrUrIoNAL CONVENTION OF 1943-44 at 4524-
25 (Microfilm Tape no. 3).
15. 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (En Banc 1944).
16. Id. at 160, 182 S.W.2d at 76 (emphasis added).
17. DEBATES OF TE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1943-44 at
4523-28 (Microfilm Tape no. 3).
18. In discussing the decision in the Coleman case and the situation in charter
cities concerning statutory and charter offices, Allen stated:
Now... they have cut down the right of a constitutional city, a city
operating under a constitutional charter to even control its licensing col-
lecting and everybody in the sound of my voice knows that it couldn't




et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
RECENT CASES
sation of any such office .... 19 The debates of the Constitutional Conven-
tion indicate that the creation and control of municipal offices by the Gen-
eral Assembly had long been a vexatious problem, especially to the two
largest charter cities of the state, Kansas City and St. Louis. 20 The debates
clearly indicate that the framers intended the constitutional language to be
unequivocal, mandatory, and all inclusive.21
The application of article VI, section 22 to various state laws has been
attempted only in a limited number of cases. 22 In fact, Cervantes is the
first case in which the provision has been construed so as to have a sub-
stantial impact on state legislation relating to municipal employees and
officials. Dicta in prior cases had, however, indicated that the court, when
confronted with a statute within the scope of article VI, section 22, would
construe the provision as giving home rule cities and their various officers
and employees a broad measure of freedom from state legislative control.
In Preisler v. Hayden,23 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
license collector of St. Louis was a county officer and therefore not covered
by article VI, section 22. However, the court also stated:
There can be no doubt that Section 22 of Article VI, 1945
Constitution, applied to all offices in cities of the constitutional
class created under Section 19, Article VI, 1945 Constitution, be-
cause the only offices they can have are municipal offices. 24
The more recent case of Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri2N
involved the application of Missouri's Prevailing Wage Act26 to contractors
performing public work for municipalities. The supreme court again re-
ferred to article VI, section 22 by way of dictum when it said that "to con-
strue the [Prevailing Wage] Act as applicable to direct employees of public
bodies would make it unconstitutional as to all cities adopting their own
charters .... " 2 7
The Preisler and Joplin cases laid the groundwork for the Cervantes
decision, but left another question unanswered. Why did not charter cities,
especially Kansas City and St. Louis, attempt to take full advantages of
article VI, section 22 prior to Cervantes?
In State v. Gunn,28 the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners brought
19. Id. at 4524, 4526.
20. Delegate Hennings of St. Louis stated that the offices of city collector
and city treasurer were subject to statutory regulation, but that the city assessor
was subject only to St. Louis' charter. Id. at 4527.
21. Delegate Allen stated:
Now there is only one way that we can settle this thing apparently,
and that is to say plainly what we mean in this Constitution. Id. at 4527.
22. Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. En
Banc 1959); Preisler v. Hayden, 309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958); Stemmler v. Einstein,
297 S.W.2d 467 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
23. 309 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1958).
24. Id. at 647.
25. 329 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
26. §§ 290.210-.310, RSMo 1959.
27. Joplin v. Industrial Commission of Missouri, 329 S.W.2d 687, 692 (Mo.
En Banc 1959) (emphasis added).
28. 326 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
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a mandamus proceeding to compel the city and its officers to appropriate
an additional sum of money under the St. Louis Police Act.2 9 The Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the statute. In State ex reL. Spink v.
Kemp30 the Missouri Supreme Court decided that under the Kansas City
Police Actsl the city's fiscal affairs were subject to such legislative control
as is necessary for the proper advancement of matters of general state con-
cern. The interesting aspect of the cases was that the cities did not argue
that the state police statutes were laws "creating or fixing the powers, duties,
or compensation of any municipal office or employment.. . ." and therefore
contrary to the prohibition of article VI, section 22. In fact, in the Gunn
case the city conceded both that State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason32 established
that the creation and maintenance of a police department was a state func-
tion, and that Mason had retained its validity and authority after the 1945
Constitution was ratified.3 3 This is equivalent to conceding that Missouri
common law supersedes the Missouri Constitution.3 4
The non-use of article VI, section 22 by home rule cities probably de-
rives from its uniqueness, political considerations (i.e. reluctance to rock
the boat, to antagonize firemen's unions, etc.), and the belief of the cities
that the state-local distinction would be applied to section 22. Although over
one-half of the states have followed Missouri's lead and by constitutional
provision have granted home rule in varying forms to their municipalities, 5
apparently only the Missouri Constitution prohibits the legislature from
interfering with the municipal offices of home rule cities. 36 The lack of
29. §§ 84.260-.340, RSMo 1959.
30. 365 Mo. 368, 283 S.W.2d 502 (En Banc 1955).
31. §§ 84.350-.860, RSMo 1959.
32. 153 Mo. 23, 54 S.W. 524 (En Banc 1899).
33. State v. Gunn, 326 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Mo. En Banc 1959).
34. See DEBATES OF THE MISSOURI CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVrNION OF 1943-44 at
4525-26:
They started with the police departments and they said, "Well, a
policeman is a state officer. Although it is true you had a right under the
Constitution to have home rule, we will see that the General Assembly has
control over that because they are state officers... " Now there is only one
way that we can settle this thing apparently, and that is to say plainly
what we mean in this Constitution.
35. ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 9; AIZ. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; CAL. CoNsT. art.
XI, § 8; CoLo. CONST. art. XX, §§ 1-6; CONN. CONsr. art. X, § 1; FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII,
§ 11; GA. CONsT. art. XV, ch. 2-83; HA IA CONST. art. VII, § 2; KAN. CONST.
art. XII, § 5; LA. CoNsT. art. XIV, § 40; MAss. CONST. art. II, § 6; MD. CONST. art.
XI-E, § 3; Micnr. CONST. art. VII, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; Nr. CoNsr. art.
XI, § 2; NEV. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; N. M. CoNsT. art. X, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. IX,
§§ 1, 2; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 7; OKLA. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 3 (a); ORE. CONST.
art. XI, § 2; PA. CONsT. art. XV § 1; R.I. CONsT. amend. XXVIII, § 2; S.D. CONST. art.
X, §§ 4, 5; TENN. CONsT. art. XI, § 9; TEx. CONST. art. XI, § 5; UTAH CONST. art.
XI, § 5; WASH. CoNsr. art. XI, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39 (a); Wisc. CONST.
art. XI, § 3.
36. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (a) grants Colorado home rule cities power to
legislate provide, regulate, conduct and control:
The creation and terms of municipal officers, agencies and employ-
ment; the definition, regulation and alteration of the powers, duties, quali-
fications and terms or tenure of all municipal officers, agents, and em-
ployees.
There is, however, no constitutional prohibition against the legislature superseding
[Vol. 8,5
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precedent from other jurisdictions has in all likelihood contributed to the
cities' limited use of section 22, but undoubtedly the largest single reason
has been the belief that the Mason case prevented section 22 from being
applied to city offices of state-wide concern. In Cervantes, however, the court
applied section 22 while recognizing expressly that a majority of the cases
from other jurisdictions hold that legislation concerning municipal fire
departments is a matter of state-wide concern.37 Thus, Cervantes can be
read as indicating that the distinction between state-wide and local concern
does not govern the applicability of section 22.
The Cervantes decision takes a long step forward in recognizing that
article VI, section 22 allows home rule cities the freedom to deal with their
employees without the General Assembly prescribing special procedures or
boards and giving special privileges to particular groups of local employees.
The new status of this constitutional principle should result in the responsi-
bility for the efficient administration of municipal offices being placed
where it properly belongs: directly in the hands of the local community.
After Cervantes, it is doubtful that article VI, section 22 will continue to
suffer from non-use. The precedent which was lacking is now available to
home rule cities, and they should not long ignore it.
J. DOUGLAS CAssrry
CONFLICT OF LAWS-MISSOURI TAKES A NEW APPROACH
TO AN OLD PROBLEM
Kennedy v. Dixon'
Lillian Kennedy brought suit against the administrator of the estate
of Mary Towey to recover damages for personal injuries she allegedly re-
ceived as a result of the deceased's negligent driving. The accident occurred
in Indiana while the parties were on a vacation trip which took them
through that state. Mrs. Kennedy lived in the same apartment building in
St. Louis as Mrs. Towey and her husband, and had accompanied the Towey's
on the trip as a guest. Plaintiff's suit was in three counts, the first of which
alleged that the law of Missouri, which does not have a guest statute, should
be applied rather than the law of Indiana which has such a statute. This
count of the petition was dismissed by the trial court following Missouri
precedent in applying the law of the place of the tort to determine all but
procedural questions, which are determined by forum law. In a well-rea-
soned and documented opinion by Judge Finch, the Missouri Supreme
the home rule cities as to their employees. In People v. McNichols, 91 Colo. 141, 13
P.2d 266 (1932) the Colorado Supreme Court held that the statutory creation of
city registrar was of state-wide concern, therefore rendering art. XX, § 6 (a) in-
applicable.
37. State en rel. Burke v. Cervantes, 423 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Mo. 1968).
1. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. En Banc 1969).
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Court reversed the trial court and decided that Missouri should join the
present trend of decisions which rejects the lex loci delicti rule of conflict
of laws and adopts the more flexible "most significant relationship" ap-
proach of the Restatement Second.2
Had the Kennedy case been decided a few years earlier, there would
have been no question as to its result; the law of Indiana, the place where
the accident occurred, would have been applied to all substantive issues in
the case. Until recently, the lex loci delicti was mechanically applied in
most jurisdictions for no other reason than the weight of precedent sup-
porting it.3 Missouri, until Kennedy, was no exception. For example, in
Robinson v. Gaines,4 the Missouri Supreme Court held that the law of the
place of the tort should determine whether one spouse should be permitted
to sue the other for negligence. Further, as late as 1967, the Kansas City
Court of Appeals, in the case of Neihardt v. Knipmeyer,5 decided that the
law of the place of the tort, rather than the parties' domicile, should de-
termine whether a guest can sue his host for the latter's negligence. It is
obvious that Kennedy implicitly overrules the Neihardt case and makes the
Robinson case very doubtful authority for the proposition that the lex loci
delicti will be applied to determine the interspousal immunity issue.6 The
effect of Kennedy is to place Missouri alongside other jurisdictions which
have overruled lex loci delicti and adopted the more flexible Restatement
Second position as urged by numerous student writers and scholars.
The Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws adopted by the Kennedy
case sets forth the most significant relationship approach as follows:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to
an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
as to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occur-
rence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.7
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the prin-
ciple of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) The place where the injury occurred,
2. RMATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW.S § 145 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1968).
3. 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2) (1967). This section cites hundreds
of cases which have applied the law of the place of the tort to substantive issues.
4. 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960).
5. 420 S.W.2d 27 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
6. This assumption stems from the fact that the two issues are quite analogous
to one another. Courts frequently cite guest statute cases for authority in intra-
familial immunity cases, and vice versa. Because of this close analogy both will be
considered together in this note.
7. Section 6, to which reference is made, lists seven relevant factors which
the scholars have deemed to be important considerations in a choice of law prob-
lem. These seven factors are as follows:
(I) the needs of the interstate and international systems; (2) the rele-
vant policies of the forum; (8) the relevant policies of other interested
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the
particular issue; (4) the protection of justified expectations; (5) the basic
policies underlying the particular field of law; (6) certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result; and (7) ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied.
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(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative im-
portance with respect to the particular issue.8
The soundness of the Missouri decision can be demonstrated by indi-
cating the problems that would have been raised had the court decided to
adhere to precedent and applied the lex loci delicti rule. The result would
have been the application of Indiana law and the Indiana guest statute.
However, it is doubtful whether this would have produced a desirable
result. Missouri, which has no guest statute, has an established policy
which dictates that a host who negligently injures a guest should bear the
consequences of that act. This policy should be especially strong when, as
in Kennedy, the host and guest were both Missouri residents, the car was
garaged and most likely insured in Missouri, the parties departed from and
planned to return to Missouri, and Missouri was the forum. Indiana's only
connection with the events in question was its concern in seeing that drivers
within its boundaries drive in a careful manner. In other words, Indiana
has no other interest than determining whether the defendant did in fact
drive negligently. It is apparent that Indiana has no concern in having its
guest statute applied under the facts presented in Kennedy. The effect of
applying Indiana law would be to say that foreign law determines whether
one Missouri resident can sue another Missouri resident in a Missouri
court. Such a result on its face is difficult to defend.
It has been argued, however, that the occasional unfortunate decision
resulting from the application of the rule of lex loci delicti is outweighed by
the relative ease of applying the rule and the fact that it provides uniformity
of result no matter where a suit is brought. Judge Storkman, dissenting
in Kennedy, considered these factors of sufficient importance to justify
retention of the old rule. 9 A number of other courts have likewise taken
this position in refusing to overrule the loci delicti rule.10 However, some
question might be raised as to the validity of this contention. It is not in-
frequent to find courts giving lip service to the loci delicti rule, and at the
same time refusing to apply that state's law because its application would
violate some public policy of the forum state."1 Indeed, Judge Donnelly in
his concurring opinion takes precisely this approach in the Kennedy case.' 2
Moreover, the courts have frequently resorted to such escape devises as char-
8. R=ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIar OF LAws § 145 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1968).
9. 439 S.W.2d at 186-87.
10. See, e.g., Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C.
609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
11. See, e.g., Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935), where
forum law was aplied after it was determined that the locus delicti (Alabama),
which permitted suits between spouses, affronted the public policy of West Virginia.
12. 439 S.W.2d at 186.
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acterization in order to avoid reaching an unjust or absurd result dictated
by a strict application of the lex loci delicti. For example, since it is a well-
settled rule that the forum applies its own procedural rules, courts fre-
quently characterize seemingly substantive issues as matters of procedure. 13
Similarly, there are a number of cases where courts have called what ap-
peared to be a tort issue one of contract.14 Conflicts authorities generally
agree that the use of escape devices such as these substantially undermine
the alleged certainty and uniformity resulting from application of the place
of wrong rule. Thus, the concurring and dissenting opinions were based
upon a dubious assumption.
Having determined that the decision is sound, it becomes necessary
to explain how the rule operates. It will be noted that in Kennedy, Indiana
had two contacts, or relationships, with the guest statute issue: the place
where the injury occurred and the place of tortious conduct. Missouri like-
wise had two contacts: one as the domicile of the parties and the other as
the place where the relationship of the parties was centered. This raises the
problem as to what a court should do when the contacts are quantitatively
equal. It is here that a complete understanding of the rule becomes critical.
As one writer has aptly stated, there is the "grave danger [that] the Restate-
ment Second will be interpreted to direct the counting of physical contacts
with the parties and with the transaction and the awarding of the palm to
the state with the 'most' contacts."' 5 To the contrary, the Restatement does
not authorize a quantitative counting, but it requires an evaluation of the
contacts "according to their relative importance."' 6 Recognizing this prop-
osition, the court in Kennedy noted that "Indiana's only real interest was
in requiring that Missouri residents comply with its standards of care for
operation of motor vehicles on its highways."1 7 The court further noted
that this interest would not be advanced by applying the Indiana guest
statute. On the other hand, since the parties are domiciled in Missouri,
this state has a real interest in seeing that one of its citizens who is negli-
gently injured recovers for his injuries. Accordingly, Missouri, with its qual-
itative superiority of contacts, should apply its own law.
It is important to note, however, that this holding need not dictate
the result in all cases. As stated in the comments to section 169 of the Re-
statement Second, "where the parties' relationship to the state of their
domicile is considerably less close than is their relationship to some other
13. For example, in Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953),
it was decided that the survival of a cause of action is not substantive, but a matter
of procedure relating to the administration of estates. Missouri cases where the
substantive-procedural distinction has been made include: Russel v. Kotsch, 336
S.W.2d 405 (Mo. 1960); Robinson v. Gaines, 331 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. 1960); Hall
Motor Freight v. Montgomery, 357 Mo. 1188, 212 S.W.2d 748 (1948); and Scott v.
Jones, 334 S.W.2d 742 (K.C. Mo. App. 1960). See generally, Note, Choice of Laws-
New Missouri Approach?, 32 Mo. L. Rv. 392 (1967).
14. E.g., Levy v. Daniels' U Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A.
163 (1928); Williams v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 360 Mo. 501, 229 S.W.2d 1 (1950).
15. Weintraub, Choice of Law in Contract, 54 IowA L. REv. 399, 413 (1968).
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT or LAws § 145 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1968) (Emphasis added).
17. 439 S.W.2d at 184-85.
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state," then the domiciliary law should not be applied.18 While section 169
refers to intrafamilial torts, the same rationale would be equally applicable
to the closely related guest statute situations. The importance of such flex-
ibility19 is emphasized by recalling the cases where courts found it necessary
to resort to various escape devices under the lex loci delicti rule,20 and by
referring to those decisions in which the court failed to utilize these devices
and reached absurd results under a literal application of lex loci delicti.
21
Once the determination and evaluation of the various relationships
is complete, the question remains as to what happens if, after such evalua-
tion, it is not clearly established which state has the most significant rela-
tionship. In anticipation of this eventuality, the court in Kennedy states
that "the trial court should continue . . .to apply the substantive law of
the place of the tort."22 The court went on to warn, however, that this
should not be used as a "means of abdicating the obligation of determining
the state which has the most significant relationship." 23
Finally, it is important to note that the majority opinion was con-
curred in by only three judges, as two judges dissented, one concurred in
the result, and one abstained.2 4 The implication this holds for the future
of Missouri conflicts law is not dear. It is hoped, however, that the court
will not retreat from its decision in Kennedy. To the contrary, it would be
desirable for the court to expand the "most significant relationship" ap-
proach to other areas besides that of tort, such as contracts. This decision
can most aptly be described as consistent with a trend of progressive de-
cisions and law review commentaries which emphasize the fact that a single,
mechanical rule frequently fails to yield desirable results.25 While it is true
18. RLESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws, Explanatory Notes § 169,
Comment b at 119 (Proposed Official Draft, 1968).
19. The fact that the rule is flexible, however, has not gone without criticism.
See Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Tort
-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB. 700
(1963).
20. See notes 11 and 13 supra.
21. For example, in Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953),
it was held that whether there was negligence in a plane crash which occurred in
Mexico after the plane had strayed off course in a flight between New Mexico and
Texas, should be determined by the law of Mexico. However, the Texas court then
dismissed the suit because it was "without jurisdiction" to administer Mexican law.
In the interspousal immunity situation, Buckeye v. Buckeye, 203 Wis. 248, 234 N.W.
342 (1931), which was the original case applying lex loci delicti to this issue, pre-
sents an equally absurd result. The effect of Buckeye was to hold that Illinois law
dictated whether a man and wife residing in Wisconsin could bring a tort action
against the other in a Wisconsin court. This is very similar to the result which
would have been reached in Kennedy had the court adhered to precedent and
applied the lex loci delicti rule.
22. 439 S.W.2d at 185.
23. Ibid.
24. The majority consisted of Judges Finch and Seiler, and Chief Judge Hol-
man. Judge Storkman dissented; Judge Donnelly concurred in the result; and Judge
Morgan did not participate as he was not a member of the court when the cause
was submitted.
25. See, e.g., Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Fabricus v. Hogan,
257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d
218 (1955); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Babcock v.
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that the court is entering into relatively unchartered territory,26 this is no
reason for continued adherence to a bad rule. It is strongly urged that future
decisions expand on this most progressive and significant decision.
KERRY D. DOUGLAS
FIDUCIARY FIDELITY IN MISSOURI-AN OMINOUS
ESCALATION
Estate of Luyties v. Scudder'
The will of one Luyties nominated one Scudder as co-executor of the
Luyties estate. Luyties also devised one third of the residuary estate to
Scudder, giving him three options: he could either take the one third, take
a certain amount of Luyties' stock at its fair market value, or take all of the
shares of stock which Mr. Luyties owned which constituted the controlling
interest in a corporation Scudder managed. Scudder chose to exercise the
third option.2
Prior to appraising the estate for Federal estate tax purposes the co-
executors hired an accountant who later reported that the assets had a per
share value of $17.60. The co-executors liquidated the stock at $24.71 per
share. A year later Scudder and co-executor Mercantile Trust Company
reported on the estate tax returns that the stock had a value of $6.00 per
share. This figure was accepted by the government.3 Scudder recanted,
however, and through his attorney informed the Internal Revenue Service
of the audit and the liquidation value. The government re-opened the estate
tax and increased the value of the stock shown on the return. As a result
the estate paid $28,031 more in estate taxes, while Scudder's capital gains
taxes were $27,817 less than they would have been under the first valua-
tion.4 Mercantile and the beneficiaries brought an action to remove Scudder
as co-executor and to recover damages for breach of fiduciary duty. The
Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Balts v. Baits,
273 Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193
A.2d 439 (1963); Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d
814 (1959); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Cheatham,
Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLTm. L. Rxv. 1229 (1963); Leflar, Com-
ments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLmrJ. L. R.v. 1247 (1963). But see Friday v.
Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963);
Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 1233 (1963); Ehrenz-
weig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Tort-Law and
Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 700 (1963).
26. At least one court has specifically utilized this argument as a basis for
refusing to reject lex loci delicti in favor of the Restatement Second approach. Shaw
v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963).
1. 432 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1968).
2. Id. at 212.
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 213.
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trial court held Scudder liable in the amount of $27,817 and the Missouri
Supreme Court affirmed.5
This case has several interesting aspects, two of which will be discussed
in this casenote. The first is the apparent extension of the duty of loyalty
owed by a fiduciary, and the second is the peculiar attitude evinced by the
court toward taxation in general. A third aspect which will only be men-
tioned in this note involves an earlier statement by the Missouri Supreme
Court that an executor represents "not ordy the heirs or legatees, but also
the law and creditors." 6 He is a fiduciary for persons interested in the
estate7 and is, therefore, a trustee who must be impartial toward the various
beneficiaries of his trust.8 It is possible that the Luyties case requires an
executor to be partial to the legatees as against the creditors of the estate,
but a thorough development of this question is beyond the scope of this
note.
An executor is given the duty of settling the affairs of a decedent's
estate, and to do this, he must pay and adjust claims. If an adjustment is
"imprudent" he may be held personally liable for it.9 The degree of care
required of an executor is stated variously as "that which prudent men
exercise in the direction and management of their own affairs,"' 0 "due
prudence,"" or "ordinary care".12 While the executor acts for the estate, the
estate is generally not liable for torts committed by the executor even if
committed while administering the estate.13 But the estate may be liable
for benefits derived from the tortious actions.' 4 It is possible for the testator,
if he so desires, to limit the liability of his executor to instances of "willful
malfeasance".15
An executor is also a trustee who must give an "undivided loyalty" to
the beneficiaries of the estate at all times.' 6 Executors are held to a standard
of "utmost good faith"'7 and "strictest accountability."' 8 As fiduciaries they
may not deal with estate property in such a way as to "gain any advantage
directly or indirectly"' 9 or "derive a personal benefit '20 for themselves.
In Texas executors are specifically forbidden to purchase estate property by
5. Id. at 216.
6. Odom v. Langston, 351 Mo. 609, 624, 173 S.W.2d 826, 835 (1943).
7. Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150, 157 (1876).
8. R.ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 183 (1959).
9. Re Leopold, 259 N.Y. 274, 276, 181 N.E. 570, 570-71 (1932).
10. Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150, 157 (1876).
11. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 Mo. 427, 434, 12 S.W. 457, 459 (1889).
12. Koteen v. Bickers, 163 Va. 676, 687, 177 S.E. 904, 908 (1935); Ewing v.
Foley, 115 Tex. 222, 228, 280 S.W. 499, 500 (1926).
13. Brown v. Guaranty Estates Corp., 239 N.C. 595, 602, 80 S.E.2d 645, 651-52
(1954); Annot., 44 A.L.R. 637 (1926).
14. 31 AM. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 260 (1967).
15. In re Mann's will, 251 App. Div. 739, 296 N.Y.S. 71, 72 (1937).
16. In re Johnson's Estate, 187 Wash. 552, 554, 60 P.2d 271, 272 (1936).
17. 31 Am. JUR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 216 (1967).
18. Strates v. Dimitosis, 110 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1940).
19. In re Alcott's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 264, 269, 232 N.Y.S.2d 371, 377 (Surr. Ct.
1962).
20. Allen v. Gillette, 127 U.S. 589, 594 (1888).
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statute.21 The same rule is in fact "a general rule of equity jurisprudence" 22
in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, executors have an "obligation to take
into possession and disclose all estate property and all information to those
interested in the estate as to estate matters ....,,.s
In the Luyties case, co-executor Scudder had a personal interest in a
high stock valuation because of his capital gains taxes. This conflicted with
the estate's interest in using a low valuation for estate tax purposes. It is a
general rule that a mere conflict of interest "is not to be deemed a dis-
qualification for appointment" as executor. 24 However, such a conflict of
interest, combined with hostility between the executor and the beneficiaries,
has been considered sufficient cause for removal.25 Some states set out
statutory grounds for removal which, if exclusive, allow the courts no dis-
cretion to disqualify on other grounds. 26 Since the Missouri statute allows
the executor to be removed if he is "unsuitable", Missouri courts have dis-
cretion as to the grounds for removal.27 Thus, it has been held that if an
administrator refuses to resign at the "development of a real and substantial
controversy" the court may revoke his letters "for unsuitability to exercise
the trust." 28
A factor which tends to influence courts which are faced with questions
about an executor's qualifications is the fact that he may have been ap-
pointed by the testator, as Scudder was in Luyties.29 Generally, "a court has
no discretion respecting the issuance of letters testamentary to persons
nominated in the will of a decedent, unless the nominees are expressly
disqualified or discretion is created by statute."3 0 As indicated, Missouri
courts have such discretion, but it is interesting that the above rule was
stated by the Missouri Supreme Court in a case which described the testa-
tor's right to appoint an executor as "an important right" respected by Mis-
21. Strates v. Dimitosis, 110 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 1940).
22. Allen v. Gillette, 127 U.S. 589, 593 (1888).
23. In re Blodgett's Estate, 93 Utah 1, 16, 70 P.2d 742, 749 (1937). As noted
in the case, this does not mean the executor must "advise ... in matters affecting
a conflict of interest between themselves."
24. Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 633, 634 (1951).
25. In re Rafferty's Estate, 877 Pa. 304, 306, 105 A.2d 147, 148 (1954). Here
the conflict involved ownership of proceeds from a disability fund and life insur-
ance policies which the administrator claimed as his own while the heirs claimed
they belonged to the estate.
26. Note, 26 WAsH. U.L.Q. 257, 258 (1940).
27. Note, 26 Wash. U.L.Q. 106, 120 (1940).
28. State v. Thym, 282 S.W.2d 178, 187 (St. L. Mo. App. 1955). One instance of
the type of controversy justifying refusal of an application for letters involved a
would-be executor who had claims against the estate, and also a devisee under a will
being contested by heirs. State ex rel. Evans v. Stahlhuth, 183 S.W.2d 384, 390 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1944).
29. Brief for Appellant-Defendant at 9-10, Estate of Luyties v. Scudder, 432
S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1968).
The Will named Mercantile Executor, and decedent's wife as co-
executors but expressly provided that should decedent's wife predecease
him (as she did) appellant Scudder was to be appointed as co-executor in
her place and stead, and directed that no bond be required of the ex-
ecutors."
30, 31 Am. JuR. 2d Executors and Administrators § 46 (1967).
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souri courts as a matter of policy. 1 In Illinois it was said that the law only
required that an appointee be "legally competent."3 2 Elsewhere courts have
stated that a testator's "solemn selection is not lightly to be disregarded" 33
and that a "court will less readily remove" an appointed trustee. 34 The
reason for such deference lies in the "testator's knowledge of a possible con-
flict of interest. 35, Furthermore, the argument can be made that "the testa-
tor intended that the executor exercise dual functions and impliedly con-
sented to any self-dealing that might be inherent in the situation."3 Such
arguments are quite relevant when we consider that in the Luyties case
Scudder was appointed by the deceased in the same instrument which
granted him the option that created the conflict of interest.
The fiduciary duties of an executor have been made more demanding
by the Luyties case. This strictness derives primarily from the fact the court
attached so little importance to those duties of an executor which are not
for the benefit of the estate alone. More precisely, the court seemed to
minimize the importance of the executor's duty to pay estate taxes. In his
application for letters, an executor promises to pay the estate debts "as
far as the assets extend and the law directs."3 7 Among claims against an
estate the estate taxes rank second only to funeral expenses,38 and generally
an executor is "personally liable for succession taxes." 39 This rule is sup-
ported by a Federal statute4O0 and is beyond dispute in Federal case law.4 1
Therefore, an executor may not default in payment of taxes and thereafter
purchase a tax title.42 And, if the government imposes a penalty for late
filing of returns, the executor himself pays the penalty.43 In addition to
such pressures there remains the possibility that the government may bring
criminal charges. The Internal Revenue Code allows prosecution of any
person who "willfully aids or assists in, or advises the preparation ... of a
return ... which is fraudulent or is false as to any material matter." 44 In
the Luyties case the co-executors reported a value of $6.00 per share, though
31. State ex rel. North St. Louis Trust Co. v. Stahlhuth, 362 Mo. 67, 72-73,
239 S.W.2d 515, 518 (1951).
32. Clark v. Patterson, 214 Ill. 533, 542, 73 N.E. 806, 809 (1905).
33. In re Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 398, 393, 114 N.E. 854, 856 (1916).
34. Reed v. Ringsby, 156 Neb. 33, 40, 54 N.W.2d 318, 322 (1952).
35. In re Foss' Will, 282 App. Div. 509, 512, 125 N.Y.S.2d 105, 108-09 (1953).
36. Note, 47 VA. L. REv. 1105, 1113 (1961).
37. § 473.017, RSMo 1959:
An application for letters testamentary or of administration shall be
verified by applicant and shall state: . . . (9) That if letters are issued,
the applicant will make a perfect inventory of the estate, pay the debts
and legacies, if any, as far as the assets extend and the law directs ....
38. § 473.397, RSMo 1959:
All claims against the estate of a decedent other than for expenses
of administration shall be divided into the following classes: (1) Funeral
expenses; (2) Debts, including taxes, to the United States....
39. Annot., 128 A.L.R. 123 (1940).
40. 31 U.S.C. § 192 (1964).
41. United States v. Cruikshank, 48 F.2d 352, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
42. Gurule v. Chacon, 61 N.M. 488, 489, 303 P.2d 696, 697 (1956).
43. In re Alexander's Estate, 360 S.W.2d 92, 93 (Mo. 1962); Sanford v. San-
ford's Adm'r, 262 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Ky. App. 1953).
44. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7206.
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the audit indicated a value of over $17.00 and the stock was actually liqui-
dated at over $24.00 per share.45 While there had been no threats of legal
action, it seems that if Scudder had been motivated by a desire to abide by
the law he should not have been held guilty of a breach of duty to the estate.
Executors have a duty to "resist taxes which they consider unwarranted,"4
but that situation was not present in Luyties.
Scudder was caught between loyalty to the estate beneficiaries and
honesty to the government. The court's resolution of this conflict is the
most significant aspect of the case. The New York case of In re Carmody's
Estate47 is very much in point here. There the executor had failed to sell
some worthless stock belonging to the estate and the residuary legatees
sought to surcharge the executor's account for the par value of the stock.
The New York court recognized that if it granted the surcharge it would be
equivalent to requiring an executor to defraud the public for the estate's
benefit. Therefore the court refused to grant the surcharge. Although the
court acknowledged the executor's duty of loyalty, it continued by stating
that "[t]his standard of conduct, however, does not absolve a representa-
tive from observing ordinary business ethics in his dealings with the pub-
lic . . . ."48 Since Scudder, too, was subject to similarly conflicting duties,
the Luyties case must be viewed as an indication that loyalty to the estate
requires an executor to set aside or, at least, subordinate his public duties.
While it was apparent in the Luyties case that Scudder's motives were es-
sentially selfish, the New York court in Carmody said, "The motive that
actuated the executor in this case is immaterial. It is the act itself in this
and other estates that becomes important."49
Another interesting feature of Luyties is that the court, by fining
Scudder the amount by which his taxes were lowered, showed an intriguing
attitude regarding taxes. A tax is "an enforced contribution for public pur-
poses . . in no way dependent upon the will or express consent of the
person taxed."5 0 It is "not a voluntary payment or donation" 51 and not "de-
rived from an agreement." 52 The Missouri court decided Luyties, however,
on the premise that Scudder himself caused the taxes to be levied. In addi-
tion, the fine which the court assessed indicates that the court believed
Scudder profited from the tax alteration. This contradicts the principle that
"the mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income."5 3 Concededly,
45. 432 S.W.2d 210, 212 (Mo. 1968).
46. In re Manville's Will, 102 N.Y.S.2d 530, 533 (Surr. Ct. 1950), aff'g 105
N.Y.S.2d 979 (1951).
47. In re Carmody's Estate, 134 Misc. 11, 13, 235 N.Y.S. 78 (1929).
48. Id. at 79-80.
49. Id. at 80.
50. State v. Kromarek, 78 N.D. 769, 52 N.W.2d 713, 715 (1952), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 968 (1952).
51. In re Oshkosh Foundry Co., 28 F. Supp. 412, 414 (E.D. Wisc. 1939).
52. People ex rel. Nassau Electric R. Co. v. Grout, 119 App. Div. 130, 131, 103
N.Y.S. 975, 975 (1907); Lane County v. State of Oregon, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71, 80
(1868. Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926). In this case the
taxpayer borrowed over 8 million marks from a German bank to finance construc-
tion contracts. Because of the devaluation of the mark, their dollar equivalent
dropped by 684 thousand dollars. Although the whole amount of the loan had been
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a low tax assessment is preferable to a high one; but, if taxes are "an en-
forced contribution" depending on impersonal facts such as the value of
stock, can it be said that Scudder realized a benefit or gain?
Luyties illustrates the harsh possibilities inherent in exercising the
duties of an executor. While the specific problem of tax valuation which
arose here is peculiarly national in character,5 4 the Luyties case makes
it more complicated in Missouri. There is the threat, however subtle, that
honesty is no longer the best policy, and may in fact be legally dangerous
if you are an executor filing a tax return for an estate. This seems an un-
fortunate and unnecessary extension of the duty of fiduciary fidelity.
IRVEN L. FmUEDHOFF
TRADE REGULATION: EXCHANGES OF PRICE
INFORMATION WHICH LEAD TO PRICE STABILIZATION
-A VIOLATION OF THE SHERMAN ACT
United States v. Container Corporation of America1
The defendants in this civil and-trust action were eighteen of the fifty
one producers of corrugated containers located in the Southeastern United
States.2 During the time period covered by the complaint, January 1, 1955
to October 14, 1963, the defendants engaged in occasional exchanges of
price information. Each defendant, when requested to do so by a co-
defendant, supplied to that co-defendant either the price charged in the
last sale to a customer or the current price quotation to that customer.
While the exact nature of the price information varied, it was always suf-
ficient to allow the co-defendant to compute the exact price he would have
to meet in order to obtain the customer's business. The exchanges were
voluntary, and each defendant generally supplied the requested information
on the assumption that he would receive similar information if and when
he requested it.
During the period covered by the complaint, the number of producers
of corrugated containers located in the Southeastern United States expanded
from thirty, with forty nine plants, to fifty one, with ninety eight plants,
lost by the taxpayer, the government attempted to tax the difference of 684 thousand
dollars. The Supreme Court disallowed the taxation.
54. This problem could not arise in England, where the taxes are all paid
by the executor before he received his letters. See Customs and Inland Revenue Act
of 1881, 44 8i 45 Vict., c. 12, §§ 27 & 30. See generally Fratcher, Fiduciary Adminis-
tration, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rlv. 12, 43 (1965).
1. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
2. The Southeastern United States as defined in this case includes the states
of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Ten-
nessee, and Kentucky. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp.
18, 21-22 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
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and total production expanded from slightly over nine billion square feet
to just under sixteen billion square feet. Defendants' sales accounted for
ninety percent of the total production in the Southeastern United States.
Due to the ready availability of raw materials and production machinery,
and the small amount of capital investment required ($50,000 to $75,000),
market entry was easy and excess capacity existed throughout the entire
eight year period covered by the complaint. Costs of production within the
industry varied from plant to plant. Within each plant the average unit
cost of production decreased as the effective utilization of plant capacity in-
creased. Short run market demand was inelastic,3 and the general price
trend of corrugated containers was downward, although prices generally
remained within a narrow range.
In this action, brought in federal district court,4 the United States,
alleging that the exchanges of price information constituted a conspiracy
to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act,5 sought an injunction pro-
hibiting all future exchanges. The district court, after making extensive
findings of fact, ruled: (1) the evidence supported neither the inference
that an agreement to exchange price information existed nor the inference
that such an agreement existed for the purposes of maintaining identical
prices to the same customer or minimizing price reductions offered to that
customer, and (2) the exchanges of information did not have the effect
of reducing, minimizing, or eliminating price competition.6 Based on these
conclusions, the district court refused to grant the injunctive relief sought
and dismissed the case. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed, with three judges dissenting.7
The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Douglas, distinguished the
instant case from other price information exchange decisions on the grounds
that here: (1) the defendants did not agree to adhere to a price schedule,8
(2) the exchanged price information included information as to individual
3. Elasticity is a measure of how much the amount purchased (demand for
a product) changes in response to a change in price. The formula for computing the
of. dean percentage change in praice.
elastcity of demand is: elasticity = percentage change in quantity. Inelastic demandpercentage cange in price.
exists when the percentage change in quantity is less than the percentage change
in price. When demand is inelastic a decrease in price results in a decrease in
total revenue providing the demand curve remains unchanged. Demand is repre.
sented graphically by plotting price on the vertical axis and quantity on the hori-
zontal axis. Demand may move from one point to another on the resulting demand
curve, or the curve itself may change its shape to either the right or left. A change
in the demand curve indicates a change in total demand. See G. L. BACH, ECONOAf-
ICs, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND POLICY 280-284 (6th ed. 1968).
4. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18 (M.D.N.C.
1967)'5. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal .... 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
6. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 67-68
(M.D.N.C. 1967).
7. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
8. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936); United States v.
Socony.Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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sales to particular customers, 9 and (3) no legal justification existed for the
exchanges. 10 The opinion concluded summarily that the supplying of price
information by a defendant upon the expectation, usually fulfilled, that
he would be furnished reciprocal information upon his request was suf-
ficient "concerted action" to establish a "combination" or "conspiracy" as
required by the Sherman Act." After discussing the voluntary nature of the
"agreement" to exchange price information and describing the corrugated
container market, the majority concluded that the "result of this reciprocal
exchange of prices was to stabilize prices at a downward level" 12 and that
this was a violation of the Sherman Act.' 3 This conclusion is unique in that
it is not a factual finding supported by evidence but rather is a theoretical
probability inferred from an economic analysis of the corrugated container
industry.
Both Justice Fortas, concurring, and the dissenters, Justices Marshall,
Harlan, and Stewart, call attention to the use of theoretical probability
rather than factual evidence. Fortas states that "theoretical probability...
is not enough"'14 unless one is to consider the mere exchange of price in-
formation to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. Fortas finds suf-
ficient evidence in the record to support a finding of price fixing. The dis-
senters not only reject the majority's inference of a lessening of competition,
but also find that the record fails to support a finding that either price
fixing or stabilization had occurred.
Reduced to its essential elements, the majority ruling is that any agree-
ment to exchange price information which results in a lessening of price
competition violates the Sherman Act. This rule itself is not an undue ex-
tension of prior anti-trust law. Existing cases not only make outright price
fixing a per se Sherman Act violation' 5 but also ban exchanges of price
information for the purpose of limiting competition.' 6 However, the means
used to establish the required competitive harm, namely, theoretical eco-
nomic analysis and reasoning, is a significant departure from prior prac-
tice. If this economic analysis approach is used in future cases, the Sherman
Act may be made applicable to a far broader range of information gather-
ing practices than it presently covers.
The theoretical economic analysis upon which the majority based its
opinion consisted of constructing a model representing the corrugated con-
tainer industry, determining that the exchanges of price information would
lessen price competition within the model, and then inferring that such
exchanges would also lessen price competition in the corrugated container
industry. This model, as described by Justice Douglas, has characteristics
9. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
10. Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
12. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 336 (1969).
13. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
14. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 339 (1969).
15. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
16. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921);
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
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of both monopolistic competition and oligopoly.1 7 The key features of the
model are an inelastic demand and price competition. Demand is inelastic
because buyers only place orders for their immediate needs. The fungible
nature of corrugated containers rules out any other type of competition
except price. When demand for a product is inelastic the total revenue
from the sale of that product decreases as the price level falls. Therefore,
the total revenue available to all sellers increases as prices rise and de-
creases as prices fall. Consequentially, it is advantageous to sellers if prices
remain stable rather than fall. Since prices did in fact remain fairly stable
despite the existence of some excess capacity and continued entry into the
industry by new firms, Justice Douglas infers that the exchanges of price
information led to a lessening of price competition.
A critical assumption in this analysis is that because defendants al-
ready had ninety percent of the market, they could not increase their total
revenue by obtaining a larger share of the market. While this is true when
all eighteen defendants are considered as a group, the assumption may not
be valid when each defendant is considered separately. It is possible that a
single firm, by cutting its prices, could increase its share of the existing
market sufficiently to increase its total revenue. In other words, since the
industry's demand curve is the average or composite of all the individual
producers' demand curves, the industry's demand curve will not be identical
to each firm's demand curve. Therefore, the course of action most bene-
ficial to an individual firm may easily be the opposite of that most beneficial
to the industry. The decision does not provide sufficient information to de-
termine if this was actually the situation in the instant case.
In addition, the majority's analysis model does not consider the effect
of the long term increase in demand. Sales expanded from approximately
nine billion to sixteen billion units during an eight year period. This long
run increase in demand could have easily offset any loss of revenue ex-
perienced by the defendants when they reduced prices. If such were the case,
actual total revenue would be increasing despite a falling price level. Thus,
it is open to question whether the model used by the majority accurately re-
flected the true market conditions within the industry.
Finally, in light of the district court's findings that the exchanges of
price information did not harm competition in that the "industry was
and is highly competitive, and each defendant engaged in and was faced
with price competition .... ,, it would seem that considerable support can
be marshalled for the argument that the analysis model constructed by
17. Monopolistic competition exists where there are many sellers of slightly
differentiated products, but not enough sellers to make the industry's market per-
fectly competitive. Oligopoly exists where there are so few competing producers
that each producer, in making his production and marketing decisions, must
consider the production and marketing choices made by other firms in the industry.
See G. L. BACH, EcoNomIcs, AN INTRODUCTION To ANALYSIS AND POLICY 337 (6th
ed. 1968). The corrugated container industry has a fungible product and a large
number of producer-sellers but is dominated by a relatively few of the producer-
sellers. The six largest firms in the industry account for approximately sixty per-
cent of the total sales.
18. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18,24 (M.D.N.C.
1967) finding of fact 16.
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Justice Douglas did not accurately represent actual conditions in the in-
dustry. If this is true, the conclusions drawn from an analysis of that model
are invalid and should not serve as the basis for finding that a violation of
the Sherman Act had occurred.
The decision also concludes summarily that the described exchanges
of price information were "concerted action .. sufficient to establish the
combination or conspiracy, which is the initial ingredient of the Sherman
Act." Yet, the district court expressly concluded that no evidence was
found to support the existence of either an agreement to exchange price
information or an agreement to exchange price information for the pur-
pose of fixing prices.20 While the Supreme Court factually distinguished
Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 21 it should be
noted that the Paramount decision stated that the concept of "conscious
parallelism" has not yet entirely read "conspiracy" out of the Sherman
Act.2 2 If some element of conspiracy is still required by the Sherman Act,
it is difficult to understand how the Supreme Court could conclude that a
combination or conspiracy existed in view of the district court's finding
that each defendant decided independently and on a request by request
basis whether to supply the desired price information.23
The district court further found that for a seller to compete effectively
he needed to know the price alternatives available to a buyer, and that the
buyer usually supplied such information to the seller.24 However, on oc-
casion, buyers were found to have furnished sellers with incomplete, inac-
curate, or misleading information.2 5 Thus, the need arose for sellers to ex-
change price information for the purpose of determining the accuracy of
information supplied by a buyer. The Supreme Court in Cement Manu-
facturers Protective Ass'n v. United States2 6 upheld the exchange of price
information when its purpose was to protect the sellers from being fraudu-
lently induced to forgo their legal rights; namely, shipping more cement
than required for a job and thereby receiving a lower price for the cement
shipped. In view of the district court's findings it would seem that a strong
argument can be made that the instant case and Cement Manufacturers
Protective Ass'n. v. United States are factually analogous to the extent that
in both cases price information was exchanged for the purpose of determin-
ing the accuracy of information supplied by buyer and avoiding sales when
that information proved to be false.
The modern commercial world functions more smoothly and ef-
ficiently when its members have full knowledge of market and business
19. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 335 (1969).
20. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 66-67(M.D.N.C. 1967).
21. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
22. Id. at 541. "Conscious parallelism" occurs when two or more firms know-
ingly pursue the same or similar courses of action. See Rahl, Conspiracy and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 44 IlM. L. Rev. 743 (1950).
23. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 28 (M.D.N.C.
1967), findings of fact 34 through 38.
24. Id. at 25, finding of fact 19 (a), (b).
25. Id. at 28, finding of fact 30.
26. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
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conditions. The establishment of systems for the dissemination of such in-
formation would therefore be desirable and should be encouraged. How-
ever, the possession of such knowledge by business entities normally leads
to a lessening of price competition in any type of industry other than one
in which pure competition exists, 27 and the protection of competition is a
cornerstone of American anti-trust policy. In prior decisions the conflict
between an efficiently functioning market and the protection of competi-
tion was resolved by holding that a lessening of competition resulting from
the acquisition of additional knowledge of business conditions was not an
unreasonable restraint of trade.2 8 In holding that any agreement to ex-
change price information which results in a lessening of price competition
is a violation of the Sherman Act, the instant decision gives the preserva-
tion of price competition precedence over the development of more ef-
ficiently functioning markets.
The majority opinion suffers from several additional deficiencies. The
most troubling is its failure to set out fully the theoretical reasoning used
to reach the conclusion that the exchanging of price information by de-
fendants had a detrimental effect on competition. Without additional data,
an analysis of the court's reasoning is most difficult. The opinion is also
confusing in that the court appears to say that any exchange of price in-
formation is per se a violation of the Sherman Act. However, by holding
that both an exchange of price information and a lessening of price com-
petition are necessary for a violation of the Sherman-Act, the court re-
jects such a per se rule. Finally, the decision concludes that the agreement
to exchange price information, though more casual, is analogous to the
one in American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States.2 9 Such a con-
clusion requires a considerable stretching of the facts. Unlike Container
Corp., the sellers in American Column followed a price schedule and made
periodic reports of their sales, shipments, and inventories to a trade as-
sociation. In return they received reports of participating sellers' sales,
shipments, and inventories. Also, all the sellers in American Column met
periodically to discuss market conditions.
In summary, the holding of Container Corp. that an agreement for the
exchange of price information which results in a lessening of price compe-
tition is a violation of the Sherman Act is not a significant departure from
prior anti-trust law. However, the use of theoretical economic analysis rather
27. Pure competition exists where there are many sellers, each acting inde-
pendently, each so small relative to the market that one seller has no effect on the
market, each selling an identical product, and each with the freedom to enter or
exit the industry as it desires. Perfect knowledge of relevant market conditions,
especially price, is found in pure competition industries. Imperfect knowledge is
found in industries of a type other than pure competition. See G. L. BACH, Eco-
NOMICS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND POLICY 322 (6th ed. 1968).
28. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83
(1925), where the court states:
The natural effect of the acquisition of the wider and more scientific
knowledge of business conditions, on the minds of those engaged in com-
merce, and the consequent effect in stabilizing production and price, can
hardly be deemed a restraint of commerce or if so it cannot, we think, be
said to be an unreasonable restraint, or in any respect lawful.
29. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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than factual findings is a significant departure from prior practice and is
most troubling. If this economic analysis approach is used in future cases,
actual proof of a lessening of price competition would not be required to
establish a Sherman Act violation. Additionally, if the conclusions drawn
from analysis of an economic model are to be valid, the analysis model must
not vary from the actual conditions found within the industry. The con-
struction of such a model is most difficult and in some cases impossible.
Since an economic model which will indicate that price competition has
been lessened30 may be constructed for any type of industry other than
one in which pure competition exists, the practical effect of the decision
may be that any exchange of price information will constitute a violation of
the Sherman Act for all but pure competition industries. In view of valid
business needs for market and price information, this writer would view
such an application of the decision as most unfortunate.
DONALD HECK
30. In a pure competition industry the number of individual producers is so
large and each producer's share of the market so small that no single producer can
affect the price level. However, in any other type of industry, individual producers
normally have some control over the price level. The amount of control varies with
the number and size of producers in the industry. Generally, as the producers grow
fewer in number and larger in size, there is an increase in the degree of control
they can individually exercise over the price level. In any industry other than pure
competition, some degree of imperfect knowledge exists. As the degree of imperfect
knowledge is reduced (individual producers learn of the available price and pro-
duction alternatives), the individual firm tends to follow the alternative most bene-
ficial to itself. In terms of price competition, if a firm learns that it is selling
above the prevailing price level it reduces its price to avoid losing sales. Conversely,
if a firm learns that it is selling below the prevailing price level it either raises its
price or, over a period of time, causes the prevailing price level to fall. (Note that
when the industry is a type other than pure competition, each firm has some con-
trol over the price level.) Therefore, uniformity of prices will increase as the indi-
vidual firms increase their knowledge of market conditions. Thus, any increase in
knowledge of the market will tend to reduce price competition in any industry
of a type other than pure competition. Any economic model constructed for such
an industry will reflect this lessening of competition. See R. H. LEFrwIcH, THE
PRICE SYSTEM AND RESOURcE ALLOCATION 169-279 (rev. ed. 1960) and E. H. CHAT-
BERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COIVPETrnON, A. RE-oRIENTATION OF THE
THEORY OF VALUE 30-53 (5th ed. 1946).
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THE TAXING POWER OF MISSOURI HOME RULE
MUNICIPALITIES
Grant v. Kansas City1
The plaintiff, a resident taxpayer of Kansas City, sought to enjoin the
city from holding a special election to approve a charter amendment au-
thorizing an additional one-half of one per cent increase in the city's exist-
ing earnings tax. In 1963, the city had enacted an earnings tax2 pursuant to
express statutory authority.3 The Circuit Court of Jackson County entered
judgment for the plaintiff on the grounds that section 92.230, RSMo set an
upper limit of one-half of one percent on the city's earning tax 4 and thus
the city's ordinance 5 which called for the special election was invalid. The
Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
The court on appeal was presented with two issues. The first was
whether the ordinance and the statute were in conflict and, if so, which
one would be given effect. This question arises in suits to determine the
validity of a municipal ordinance enacted under a home rule charter be-
cause of the Missouri Constitutional requirement that the city charter
be "consistent with and subject to the constitution and laws of the state."6
The Missouri Supreme Court has not construed the language as narrowly
as a literal reading might require.7 The court has said that the enactments
of the home rule cities must be "consistent with and subject to the Consti-
tution and laws of the state" only as they relate to matters not of purely
local or corporate concern.8 It has always been held in Missouri that the
taxing power is not a mater of purely local or corporate concern. 9
The second issue, was whether the city, by virtue of being a home rule
municipality, had the power to provide for the enactment of the earnings
tax by charter amendment if there was no resulting conflict with a state
statute. The court unanimously held that the ordinance was in conflict with
section 92.230, RSMo, but Chief Justice Holman, writing for a majority of
the court, left open the question of whether a constitutional charter city
"would have the authority to amend its charter to provide for an earnings
tax in the absence of an applicable conflicting state statute on the sub-
1. 431 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
2. Kansas City Charter art. XX, § 487.
3. § 92.210, RSMo 1963 Supp.
4. § 92.230, RSMo 1963 Supp.
5. Kansas City, Mo., Committee Substitute for Ordinance 35205, April 19,1969.
6. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 19 provides:
Any city having more than 10,000 inhabitants may frame and adopt
a charter for its own government, consistent with and subject to the con-
stitution and laws of the state.
7. See, Schmandt, Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. U. L.Q.
385, 388.
8. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (En Banc
1928); Kansas City v. Marsh Oil Co., 140 Mo. 458, 41 S.W. 943 (En Banc 1897).
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ject."'10 Justice Seiler concurred in the result but said that "if it were not
for section 92.230 antedating the proposed amendment, I would have no
hesitancy in holding that Kansas City could increase the earnings tax by
amending its charter so to provide."" Justice Eager, who also concurred,
could not decide whether the city would have the power to increase the tax
in absence of a conflicting state statute.1 2
Justice Eager is not alone in being uncertain as to what the law is in
Missouri concerning the powers of a home rule municipality.a This con-
fusion has largely resulted from the Missouri courts' failure to distinguish
between the situation in which a city ordinance conflicts with an express
statutory or constitutional provision and the situation in which there is no
such conflict with the city's initiative.' 4 Very few Missouri cases have rec-
ognized this distinction.' 5 However, these two problems are distinct.
[I] t is one thing to argue that there should be no limit on mu-
nicipal power in the absence of an express prohibition; it is quite
another thing to argue that some municipal enactments should pre-
vail over conflicting statutes. 16
The result in Grant v. Kansas City is not surprising, since prior de-
cisions of the Missouri Supreme Court have held that state statutes pre-
vail over conflicting municipal ordinances which deal with taxation. 17 On
the other hand, there is equally persuasive authority for the proposition
that municipal taxes enacted without legislative authorization are valid
when there is no conflicting state statute.
The Missouri Constitution places the power to tax in the General
Assembly.' 8 However, the grant of the taxing power is not exclusive. Cities,
when they adopt a home rule charter,' 9 have all the powers necessary for a
10. 431 S.W.2d at 94.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Schmandt, supra note 7, at 388.
14. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule: A Role for
the Courts, 48 MINN. L. Rmv. 643, 650-52 (1964).
15. The fact that the Grant case recognizes the distinction is an indication that
some of the confusion in future cases will be less apparent.
16. Westbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Ex.
perience, 33 Mo. L. Rlv. 45, 47 (1968).
17. State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (En Banc
1928); Ex parte Tarling, 241 S.W. 929 (Mo. En Banc 1922).
18. Mo. CousT. art X, § 1 provides:
The taxing power may be exercised by the general assembly for state
purposes, and by counties and other political subdivisions under power
granted to them by the general assembly for county, municipal and other
corporate purposes.
19. Mo. CONsT. art. VI, §§ 19-20.
§ 82.020, RSMo 1954 provides:
Any city in this state which now has or which may hereafter have a
population of more than ten thousand inhabitants according to the last
preceding federal decennial census may frame and adopt or amend a
charter for its own government by complying with the provisions of sec-
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complete system of local self-government. It can thus be implied that there
is some grant of the taxing power, because this power is necessary for the
city to carry on its functions as a self-governing body.20 Without some grant
of the taxing power in the grant of a home rule charter, the municipality
could not exercise its taxing power unless specifically authorized to do so
by the General Assembly.
The early cases in Missouri had little difficulty sustaining the taxing
power of home rule municipalities.2 ' The Missouri Supreme Court in St.
Louis v. Sternberg2 2 said the city had the taxing power, since
it must be presumed that the framers of the constitution had in
their minds the fact that it was wholly impossible to conduct a
city government in a city like St. Louis without the power of taxa-
tion being vested in those charged with conducting such govern-
ment.
The court further stated in American Union Express Co. v. St. Joseph23
that by reason of the direct grants of power contained in the constitution,
the city may adopt any method of taxation for local purposes that the
legislature of the state could have adopted and delegated by statute. These
early decisions involved no conflicting statutory provisions.
If the extensive taxing power in these early cases had been recognized
as power of home rule cities to tax in the absence of a conflicting statutory
or constitutional provision, their taxing power would not be as uncertain
as it is today. However, when the courts were faced with a conflicting state
statute, they developed certain conceptual tests to determine whether the
ordinance or the statute would prevail.2 4 The courts then tried to apply
20. Kansas City v. Frogge, 552 Mo. 233, 241, 176 S.W.2d 498, 502 (1943); St.
Louis v. Steinberg, 69 Mo. 289 (1879).
21. Ex parte Asotsky, 319 Mo. 810, 5 S.W.2d 22 (En Banc 1928); St. Louis
v. McCann, 157 Mo. 301, 57 S.W. 1016 (1900); St. Louis v. Bowler, 94 Mo. 630,
7 S.W. 434 (1888); St. Louis v. Sternberg, 69 Mo. 289 (1879); American Union
Express Co. v. St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675 (1877). "Municipal enactments were struck
down or overridden during this period, but this occurred in cases in which there
were (1) conflicts with statutes, (2) the ordinance was held to violate due process,
or (3) the municipal charter did not authorize the enactment of the ordinance."
Westbrook, supra note 16, at 52.
22. 69 Mo. 289, 298-99 (1879).
23. 66 Mo. 675, 680-81 (1877). See also St. Louis v. McCann, 157 Mo. 301,
57 S.W. 1016 (1900).
24. The statute would prevail when the activity was: (1) governmental, Cole-
man v. Kansas City, 353 Mo. 150, 182 S.W.2d 74 (En Banc 1944); Kansas City v.
J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 337 Mo. 913, 87 S.W.2d 195 (1935); State ex tel.
Garner v. Missouri & Kansas Telephone Co., 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (En Banc
1905); (2) of statewide concern, School District of Kansas City v. Kansas City, 382
S.W.2d 688 (Mo. En Banc 1964); (3) of general concern, State ex tel. Zoological
Board v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 910, 1 S.W.2d 1021 (En Banc 1928); (4) high govern-
mental interest, Turner v. Kansas City, 354 Mo. 857, 191 S.W.2d 612 (1945); (5)
paramountly concerning state interests, Joplin v. Industrial Comm'n of Missouri,
329 S.W.2d 687 (Mo. En Banc 1959.
It has been suggested that the decision of the courts, when they are faced with
a state-local conflict, is usually based on the judgment of the courts as to whether
the public interest requires that the ultimate decision be determined by the state
rather than the city. Westbrook, supra note 16, at 62-63.
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these tests in all situations, whether or not there was a conflicting state
enactment. The application of such conceptual tests to situations involving
no express statutory conflict would necessarily make the taxing power
operative only through the authority of the state legislature. As a result,
doubts arose as to the municipality's taxing power.
Two Missouri cases, although criticized as detrimental to the autonomy
of home rule cities in the taxing area, 25 appear to authorize taxing power
solely under the cities' home rule charters. Kansas City v. Frogge26 invali-
dated a Kansas City use tax on all property purchases for use in the city
upon which the state tax had not been paid. The court held that although
this subject had not been covered by the state sales tax, in order for the
city to impose the tax, it must either be authorized by the state legislature
or by the people of the city in the charter. The court did not hold that
the city had no power to enact the tax but only that the tax had not been
provided for in the charter.27 In Carter Carburetor Corp. v. St. Louis28
the court held that the city's charter was not specific enough to allow the city
to impose an earnings tax. As in Frogge, the court did not preclude the
city's power to impose an earnings tax but held only that the charter did
not authorize such a tax.2 9
These two cases do not take away a city's power to levy taxes with-
out enabling legislation from the General Assembly. Although these cases
did restrict the taxing power of the city from that found in the early Mis-
souri decisions, 30 the city may still exercise the power when authorized
either by the legislature or the people through specific provisions in the
city's charter. This is considerably more power than would be allowed
under a literal application of those conceptual tests mentioned above.
Cities in Missouri are now faced with the problem of which method
to use in exercising the taxing power. Should the city seek enabling legis-
lation3 ' or should it seek authorization from the people of the city by
amending the city charter? The Grant case indicates what may happen when
the city seeks to act in an area covered by an enabling statute. The statute
may place a restriction on the exercise of the power granted. If this is the
case, the city cannot modify the restriction imposed by the legislature by
amending the charter since this would not be "consistent with the laws of
the state." 32 Where no legislative restriction exists, the recent cases have
generally sustained the taxing power if the tax is specifically authorized
25. Cohn, Municipal Revenue Powers in the Context of Constitutional Home
Rule, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 27, 44 (1956).
26. 352 Mo. 235, 176 S.W.2d 498 (1943).
27. Id. at 239, 176 S.W.2d at 501.
28. 356 Mo. 646, 203 S.W.2d 438 (En Banc 1947).
29. Id. at 660, 203 S.W.2d at 445.
80. State ex rel. People's Motorbus Co. v. Blaine, 352 Mo. 582, 58 S.W.2d 975(1932); Automobile Gasoline Co. v. St. Louis, 326 Mo. 435, 32 S.W.2d 281 (1930).
31. The earnings tax has been upheld when it was enacted pursuant to
specific authorization from the General Assembly. Barhost v. St. Louis, 423 S.W.2d
845 (Mo. En Banc 1967); Arnold V. Berra, 366 S.W.2d 321 (Mo. En Banc 1963);
Walters v. St. Louis, 259 S.W.2d 377 (Mo. En Banc 1953).
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by the charter of the city.33 In Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Serv-
ice, the court said:
Plaintiffs-appellants are correct in urging that the power to
tax is a governmental function inherent in the State ... exercised
by the legislature subject to constitutional limitations. But there
are matters governmental in character, including taxation, over
which a city may exercise authority delegated to it.... A city, the
people of which have framed and adopted a charter under direct
constitutional authority, may exercise such powers of local self-
government, including taxation, as the people of the city have
delegated to it by charter subject to constitutional limitation.3 4
In spite of the case authority supporting the power of home rule
cities to levy taxes that are specifically authorized in the charter, Missouri
home rule cities in recent years have consistently sought enabling legisla-
tion for taxation from the legislature. It appears that they have been deterred
from relying on their home rule powers by the dicta and confusion in court
opinions dealing with conflicts between state statutes and local enactments.
Since the legislature often places rather strict limits on the taxing power
granted by statute, home rule cities could obtain long range benefits if
they would base taxes on their home rule powers rather than legislative
authorization. Although the existing uncertainty in the law might result
in litigation if cities now choose this basis for local taxation, the time and
expense involved in litigating the issue of the taxing power of home rule
muncipalities would clearly be justified by successful elimination of their
dependence on the legislature in this vital area of municipal concern.
WILLIAm L. HUBBARD
33. General Installation Co. v. University City, 379 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. En Banc
1964); Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, 235 S.W.2d 355 (Mo. 1950).
34. Giers Improvement Corp. v. Investment Service, supra note 33, at 358.
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JUVENILE SOCIAL RECORDS AND CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan'
On December 3, 1963, a 15 year old boy named Arbeiter was arrested
by the St. Louis police. During police interrogation he admitted entering an
apartment and stabbing its occupant. Later that evening he was transferred
to the custody of the juvenile authorities. On December 30, the juvenile
court relinquished jurisdiction and certified Arbeiter for trial under the
general criminal law. Arbeiter was indicted for first degree murder, tried,
convicted, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the Missouri Su-
preme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial,2 holding that
the admission into evidence of statements made during Arbeiter's initial
detention and interrogation by the police violated certain provisions of the
juvenile code.3
On January 6, 1967, in preparation for Arbeiter's new trial, the circuit
attorney filed a motion for a subpoena duces tecum to inspect the records of
the juvenile court concerning Arbeiter.4 The State sought admissions Ar-
beiter had made while in the custody of juvenile authorities. The subpoena
was issued over objections by the defense. The defense was successful in ob-
taining a preliminary writ of prohibition to quash the subpoena. After
an appropriate hearing the supreme court quashed the preliminary writ of
prohibition and held that when the juvenile court certified Arbeiter for
trial, it relinquished to the criminal court the power to order the inspection
of juvenile files by persons having a legitimate interest therein.5 The court
also held that such inspection could be ordered by the issuance of a sub-
poena duces tecum.6  /
The juvenile courts are courts of special jurisdiction. Early reformers
were appalled by the fact that children could be subjected to adult pro-
cedures and penalties and that they could be given long prison sentences to
1. 427 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. En Banc 1968), rehearing denied May 13, 1968.
2. State v. Arbeiter, 408 S.W.2d 26 (Mo. 1966).
3. § 211.061 (1), RSMo 1959, provides: "When a child is taken into custody
... the child ... shall be taken immediately and directly before the juvenile court
or delivered to the juvenile officer or person acting for him." (emphasis supplied.)
4. Mo. R. CGaM. P. 25.19 states:
A subpoena duces tecum may be issued by the court or the clerk
thereof, upon application of either party, commanding the person to
whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other
objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be illegal, unreasonable or
oppressive. The court may direct that books, papers, documents or objects
designated in the subpoena be produced before the court at a time prior
to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence
and may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or
objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their attor-
neys.
5. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371, 377-78 (Mo. En Banc
1968).
6. Id. at 374.
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be served with hardened criminals. 7 This reflected the feeling that the child
was essentially good, and, if cared for and guided by the state he could be
rehabilitated.8 Accordingly, juvenile proceedings were set up, not to de-
termine the guilt or innocence of the child, but to determine whether the
child was delinquent.9 The proceedings were not adversary in nature, 10
the hearing was not a criminal one, and criminal procedures were not ap-
plicable."1 The child was to be "treated" and "rehabilitated" through in-
stitutionalization which was to be clinical rather than punitive in nature.' 2
In theory, the hearings were to be private and all records confidential in na-
ture.'8 Furthermore, constitutional safeguards did not apply14 because the
state was acting as parens patriae for the child.' 5 The theory of parens
patriae was further buttressed by the principle that the child had a right,
not to liberty, but to custody. If the parents failed to provide that custody,
the state could intervene and care for the child.1 6
In a series of recent cases the federal courts have shifted to the view
that constitutional safeguards, particularly the right to due process and a
privilege against self-incrimination, are applicable to juvenile court pro-
ceedings. 17 In 1961, a federal court of appeals stated that juvenile procedures
are governed by "fundamental fairness" and that admissions made in
juvenile hearings were to be kept out of adult courts in order to preserve
the effective workings of the juvenile courts.' 8 In 1964, the same court
stated that evidence obtained from juvenile proceedings may be admissible
in criminal proceedings if used properly' 9 and that a juvenile's attorney
should be allowed to inspect the youth's juvenile social file.20 In 1965, the
7. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967).
8. In re C., 314 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Spr. Mo. App. 1958). See § 211.011, RSMo1959.
9. State ex rel. Shartel v. Trimble, 333 Mo. 888, 892, 63 S.W.2d 37, 38 (1933).
10. Dix, Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Correctional Institutions, 1966 Wis. L.
REv. 866 (1966).
11. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959); State v. Tolias,
326 S.W.2d 329, 333 (Mo. 1959); State ex rel. Matacia v. Buckner, 300 Mo. 359,
365, 254 S.W. 179, 180 (En Banc 1923); In re C., 314 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1958). In Pee v. United States, supra at 561-62, the court cites authority from
every state that proceedings in juvenile courts are not criminal cases.
12. State v. Harold, 364 Mo. 1052, 1055, 271 S.W.2d 527, 529 (1954).
13. § 211.171, RSMo 1959; Opinion of Attorney General of Missouri, January
16, 1958; Gough, The Expungment of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147 (1966); Riederer, Secrecy
or Privacy?, 17 J. oF Mo. BAR 66 (1961).
14. State v. Heath, 352 Mo. 1147, 1150, 181 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1944); Ex parte
Naccarat, 328 Mo. 722, 726, 41 S.W.2d 176, 178 (En Banc 1931); Minor Children
of F.B. v. Caruthers, 323 S.W.2d 397, 400 (St. L. Mo. App. 1959); But see § 211.211,
RSMo 1959 which affords the right of counsel to a child before his commitment to
the State Board Training School.
15. State v. Couch, 294 S.W.2d 636, 639 (St. L. Mo. App. 1956).
16. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17 (1967).
17. E.g., United States v. Constanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); Shioutakon
v. District of Columbia, 236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d
633 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Application of Johnson, 178 F.Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1957).
18. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
19. Edwards v. United States, 330 F.2d 849, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
20. Watkins v. United States, 343 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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Supreme Court stated that the juvenile court must give a juvenile the right
to a hearing before transferring his case to an adult court.21 Finally, in
1967, the Supreme Court decided that a juvenile had the right to due
process, including proper notice for hearings, right to counsel, and a
privilege against self-incrimination, and that the juvenile courts were un-
able to commit a child in the absence of sworn testimony.22
In analyzing the problem of whether to allow inspection of a juvenile's
social file initial inquiry must be made into the Missouri Juvenile Code,
which states:
The proceedings of the juvenile court shall be entered in a
book kept for that purpose and known as the juvenile records.
These records as well as all information obtained and social rec-
ords prepared in the discharge of official duty for the court shall be
open to persons having a legitimate interest therein.23
Under the wording of this statute the circuit attorney can, if he has a
"legitimate interest," inspect the juvenile court's records either before or
after the time of the juvenile's transfer to adult court. 24 The question of
whether to release the juvenile's records is one of policy for the individual
judge to decide. The purpose of the transfer of a juvenile to adult criminal
courts is to protect the public where rehabilitation is impossible.25 Pre-
sumably, this public protection would be increased by a disclosure of the
juvenile's past files.26 On the other hand, to allow a disclosure of juvenile
files, as did the Arbeiter court, could negate the purpose of the juvenile
courts by destroying the confidentiality of the proceedings as well as the
juvenile's trust in them. 27
By permitting the inspection of Arbeiter's juvenile records the court
has struck a crippling blow to the confidentiality of juvenile court proceed-
ings in Missouri. Allowing a juvenile's records to be inspected by anyone
with a "legitimate interest therein" means that, although it seems safe to
assume the press would not have such "legitimate interest," the records could
possibly be opened up to prospective employers, insurance investigators,
and the like.28 Even if the prosecutor alone were allowed to inspect the
records, the confidentiality surrounding juvenile procedures would be de-
stroyed to such an extent that a juvenile's lawyer would advise him to
remain silent in order to avoid the possibility of damaging disclosures be-
coming available to the prosecutor should the case be shifted to the adult
courts. By destroying the confidentiality surrounding juvenile proceedings
the court seems to have shifted away from the type of thinking upon which
the theory of parens patriae is based.
The second question discussed in Arbeiter is whether there exists,
21. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1965).
22. Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
23. § 211.321 (1), RSMo 1959 (emphasis added).
24. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
25. Id. at 377.
26. In Arbeiter, the admissions were no longer secret anyway because of the
notoriety of Arbeiter's first trial. Id., at 377.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUm. L.
R v. 281, 286-89 (1967); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts,
and Individualized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REv. 775, 800 (1966).
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in Missouri, a proper procedure for discovery of a juvenile's social file.
Although there was no right of criminal discovery at common law, 29 scholars
have argued extensively the pros and cons of the matter.3 0 This discussion
has caused several jurisdictions,3 1 with the federal courts at the forefront, "2
to develop and expand the area of criminal discovery. In Missouri the
courts, not bound by the federal rules,3 3 have held that there is no general
right of criminal discovery.34 While disclosure usually is a question within
the discretion of the court,3 5 the courts have generally required that the
information sought be admissible in evidence, and therefore relevant and
material,36 and that good cause be shown for inspection.37 Courts will also
29. Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 843 (8th Cir. 1949); United States
v. Schine, 16 F.R.D. 514, 516 (W.D.N.Y. 1955).
30. Boyd, The Inadequacy of Pretrial Discovery in Missouri Criminal Cases,
31 Mo. L. REv. 424 (1966); Datz, Discovery in Criminal Procedure, 16 U. FLA. L.
REV. 163 (1963); Louisell, The Theory of Criminal Discovery and the Practice of
Criminal Law, 14 VAn. L. Rxv. 921 (1961); Orfield, Discovery and Inspection in
Federal Criminal Procedure, 59 W. VA. L. Ruv. 221 (1957); Comments, 35 FoRw-
HAM L. Rnv. 315 (1966), 49 MARQ. L. REv. 736 (1966); Notes, 21 MONT. L. Rv.
189 (1960), 18 VAD. L. REv. 1640 (1965).
A compilation of the reasons for expansion of criminal discovery includes:
(a) elimination of surprise results in fairer trials; (b) more effective use can be
made of cross-examination; (c) defense counsel can better advise his client with
more of the facts before him; (d) all parties can have equal access to the results
obtained by the State's highly technical and effective investigatory equipment and
procedures; (e) narrower issues will be presented to the jury; (f) dockets will be
reduced by an increase in pretrial settlements; (g) expanded discovery has worked
well in civil cases; (h) since an innocent defendant may be unaware of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the alleged crime, such discovery procedures are necessary
for his defense; (i) the trial will be expedited.
Some reasons against expansion of criminal discovery are: (a) the defendant
already has an unfair advantage in criminal proceedings; (b) dockets will be
overcrowded due to fewer pleas of guilty; (c) there will be increased dishonesty
because of the higher stakes involved in criminal cases than in civil cases; (d) sub-
ornation of perjury is possible (although it is argued that the normal safeguards
against perjury will adequately prevent this problem from arising); (e) there will
be a possibility of tampering with witnesses and a need to protect them from
harassment; (f) there is no mutuality of discovery because of defendants right
against self-incrimination; (g) there may be a destruction of evidence; (h) current
procedures, including continuance, are adequate to insure a fair trial; (i) there
will be "fishing expeditions" into the work product of the other party.
31. Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 8 (1965).
32. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668 (1957); Bergman v. United
States, 253 F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1958); United States v. Longarzo, 43 F.R.D. 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33. State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 815 (Mo. 1964); State v. Simon, 375
S.W.2d 102, 104 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
34. State v. Maxwell, 400 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. 1966); State v. Aubuchon,
supra note 33, at 813.
35. State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Clagett
v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278, 290 (Mo. En Banc 1959); State ex rel. Missouri Pac. R.R.
v. Hall, 325 Mo. 102, 104, 27 S.W.2d 1027, 1027 (En Banc 1930).
36. State v. Redding, 357 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Mo. 1962); State v. Gilliam, 351
S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1961), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 914 (1964); State v. Kelton, 299
S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1957); State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 365 Mo. 160, 164, 278
S.W.2d 737, 740 (En Banc 1955); State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363
Mo. 1065, 1071, 257 S.W.2d 69, 72 (En Banc 1953); State ex rel. Bostelmann v.
Aronson, 361 Mo. 535, 544, 235 S.W.2d 384, 388 (En Banc 1950).
37. State v. Cody, 379 S.W.2d 570, 574 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Phelps v.
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consider whether discovery will expedite the trial,3 8 whether the document
is privileged, 9 and whether production of it would be illegal, unreasonable,
or oppressive.40 Moreover, discovery cannot be granted for "fishing expedi-
tions," 41 for prying into the adversary's preparation for trial,42 merely to
impeach a witness, 43 or upon a mere suspicion that the doeument might
contain relevant evidence.44 Discovery must also be within the jurisdiction
of the court.45 Missouri courts have allowed inspection of memoranda used
by a witness to refresh his memory when testifying in court,46 but not of
memoranda used to refresh the memory of a witness outside of court.47
To determine whether a subpoena duces tecum can be used for the
discovery of a juvenile's records, a court must look to Missouri Criminal
Rule 25.19,48 which provides for the issuance of such a subpoena when
applied for by a party and when compliance would not be illegal, unrea-
sonable, or oppressive. 49 Although it has been argued that this rule does
not provide a statutory basis for criminal discovery,50 the pre-trial produc-
tion of a juvenile's records surely will expedite the trial and, since there is
no broad system of criminal discovery in Missouri, it would seem that the
rule should be interpreted liberally, allowing the subpoena to be issued.51
It was such a line of reasoning that led the Arbeiter court, in effect, to allow
the criminal discovery of documented matter without a showing of ad-
missibility, relevance, or materiality and without any showing of good cause
McQueen, 296 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Mo. En Banc 1956); State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey,
supra note 36, at 163, 278 S.W.2d at 740; State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v.
Flynn, supra note 36, at 1071, 257 S.W.2d at 72.
38. State ex rel. Phelps v .McQueen, supra note 37, at 89.
39. State ex rel. Headrick v. Bailey, 365 Mo. 160, 163, 278 S.W.2d 737, 740
(En Banc 1955); State ex rel. Terminal R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1071, 257
S.W.2d 69, 72 (En Banc 1953); State ex rel. Bostelmann v. Aronson, 361 Mo.
535, 546, 235 S.W.2d 884, 389 (En Banc 1950).
40. Mo. R. Caum. P. 25.19.
41. State v. Maxwell, 400 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Mo. 1966); State ex rel. Bostel-
mann v. Aronson, 361 Mo. 535, 546, 235 S.W.2d 384, 391 (En Banc 1950); State
v. Brown, 360 Mo. 104, 118, 227 S.W.2d 646, 650 (1950); State ex rel. St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 111, 120, 171 S.W.2d 569, 574 (1943).
42. State v. Aubuchon, 381 S.W.2d 807, 814 (Mo. 1964); State v. Kelton, 299
S.W.2d 493, 497 (Mo. 1957); State v. McDonald, 342 Mo. 998, 1004, 119 S.W.2d
286, 289 (1938).
43. State v. Kelton, supra note 42, at 497; State v. McDonald, supra note 42, at
1004, 119 S.W.2d at 289; State ex rel. Land Clearance for Redevelopment Au.
thority of Kansas City v. Southern, 284 S.W.2d 898, 897 (K.C. Mo. App. 1955).
44. State ex rel. Page v. Terte, 324 Mo. 925, 982, 25 S.W.2d 459, 462 (En
Banc 1930).
45. State ex Tel. Headrick v. Bailey, 365 Mo. 160, 164, 278 S.W.2d 737, 740
(En Banc 1955); State ex Tel. Terminal R. Ass'n v. Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 1071, 257
S.W.2d 69, 72 (En Banc 1953).
46. State v. Tracy, 294 Mo. 372, 243 S.W. 173 (1922); State v. Patton, 255
Mo. 245, 164 S.W. 223 (1914).
47. State v. Miller, 368 S.W.2d 353 (Mo. 1963).
48. Mo. R. Cium. P. 25.19.
49. Mo. R. CPmu. P. 25.19.
50. State v. Engberg, 377 S.W.2d 282, 286 (Mo. 1964); State ex rel. Phelps
v. McQueen, 296 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Mo. En Banc 1956).
51. State ex rel. Arbeiter v. Reagan, 427 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Mo. En Banc 1968).
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other than a strong suspicion that the documents would .contain incrimi-
nating statements made by the defendant.
It would thus appear that the state, or a defendant,52 could compel
discovery of an item under Missouri Criminal Rule 25.19 merely by apply-
ing for it and showing that compliance with the subpoena, if issued, would
not be illegal, unreasonable, or oppressive. However, discovery is still within
the discretion of the court53 and the considerations of admissibility, rele-
vancy, and materiality will probably remain important factors in determin-
ing to what extent the courts will allow criminal discovery in the future.
Arbeiter could have a twofold effect on Missouri law. By destroying
much of the confidentiality surrounding the juvenile disciplinary system
the court displays an attitude vastly different from that upon which the old
theory of parens patriae is based. It is impossible to predict how this new
thinking will change the current juvenile court system. The Arbeiter court
also displays a more liberal attitude toward criminal discovery than it has
in the past. Although this attitude might lead one to predict an expansion
in the use of criminal discovery in Missouri, recent cases show the court's
reluctance to allow such expansion.54
MICHAEL B. McKINNIS
52. Since Mo. R. CriM. P. 25.19 (emphasis added) states, "A subpoena duces
tecum may be issued... upon application of either party .... " it would seem
that a judicial interpretation of it concerning criminal discovery by the prosecu-
tion would apply with equal force to the situation in which the defendant is seek-
ing criminal discovery.
58. Cases cited note 34 supra.
54. State v. Balle, 442 S.W.2d 35 (Mo. 1969); State v. Yates, 442 S.W.2d 21
(Mo. 1969); State v. Coleman, 441 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. 1969).
[Vol. 35
49
et al.: Recent Cases
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1970
RECENT CASES
SECURITIES REGULATION: WHO MAY VIOLATE
RULE 10b-5 BY REMAINING SILENT
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.'
The Securities and Exchange Commission brought this action against
Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) and thirteen of its directors, officers, and em-
ployees for alleged violations of Section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 19342 and SEC Rule 10b-5.3 The complaint alleged that defendants
had purchased shares of TGS, had caused others to purchase shares of TGS,
had accepted TGS stock options, and had caused a misleading press release
to be issued, all while in possession of secret, material information which
defendants failed to disclose to the sellers. This information, which con-
sisted of assay reports on ore samples, was corporate information, intended
to be used only by the corporation, and available to the other defendants
only because of their position in the corporation. The SEC alleged that by
using this information to further their own interests in the purchase of
securities, without disclosing the information to the sellers, the defendants
violated Rule 10b-5.
Drilling completed in November, 1968, indicated the possibility of
substantial mineral deposits in the Timmons, Ontario, area, and TGS began
buying land near the site of the mineralization. A press release was issued
on April 12, 1964 which, in effect, denied any substantial discovery. Then,
on April 16, a second press release appeared confirming that a large body
of ore had been discovered. The stock transactions which were the subject
of the action were completed between November, 1963, and April 16, 1964.
The district court dismissed the complaint against all but two defend-
ants, Crawford and Clayton,4 holding that the drilling results were not
sufficiently indicative of a substantial mineral discovery to constitute "ma-
terial" information when the stock transactions occurred. It found that only
Crawford and Clayton had purchased shares after the information had
become material. The appellate court affirmed in regard to Crawford and
Clayton, but reversed dismissal of the complaint against the other defend-
ants, except one Murray, who the appellate court agreed had no knowledge
1. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) 1964.
3. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 1968, states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails
or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
4. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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of the discovery.5 The case is highly complex, involving many issues.6 This
note covers only the question of what classes of persons might conceivably
violate Rule 10b-5 by withholding material information.
Upon certain persons falls the duty either to communicate to prospec-
tive buyers or sellers of securities all of the material information they
possess in regard to the securities concerned, or to refrain from trading
such securities. 7 Defendants held liable by the appellate court in Texas Gulf
Sulphur were executives, directors, and employees of TGS, all of whom had
a duty to the corporation not to disclose the information in order that the
corporation might acquire mineral rights in the area at reasonable prices.8
Much of the importance of this case lies in the acceptance by the court of
the SEC rules for deciding who is an "insider." The court then used these
rules to expand the existing case law by including corporate employees be-
low the executive level in the category of "insiders" liable under Rule 10b-5
for non-disclosure of material information.
Prior to the promulgation of Rule lOb-5, there was only a limited duty
to disclose any information in a stock transaction. The only persons required
to disclose information in regard to a transaction were those who owed
some fiduciary duty to the other party in the transaction. The general rule
in stock transactions was that officers and directors of a corporation owed
no such fiduciary duty to the individual shareholders. 9 However, in Strong
v. Repideo a shareholder owning three-fourths of a corporation was held
liable to a minor shareholder after the former, a director, purchased shares
from the latter without revealing that the government had offered to pur-
chase the assets of the corporation at a price which would greatly increase
the value of the shares. The court ruled that even though there would nor-
5. Only defendants Coates and Kline applied for certiorari. This was denied
in 394 U.S. 976, with Justice White dissenting as to defendant Kline.
6. The major disagreement between the trial court and the appellate court
concerned the materiality of the undisclosed information. The trial court believed
that the test of materiality should be a conservative one while the appellate court
asked only whether a reasonable man would attach importance to the information
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. Another point
of disagreement was the question of requirements regarding a corporate press re-
lease. The dissent in the appellate court believed that confirmation of the discovery
at the time of the first press release would have been a reckless and misleading
statement. If they violated the law by denying the discovery as the majority held,
what should defendants have done? This question may be answered in later de-
cisions regarding this case.
The case was remanded to the district court for decisions on several other
issues left undecided. Among these are: What are the appropriate remedies for the
violations? Will the defendants be liable to anyone who sold TGS shares during
this period? The parties stipulated in the first trial that these questions would be
deferred until it had been decided whether defendants had breached Rule lOb-5.
Another unusual aspect of this case is that it is a civil suit for damages brought
by the SEC itself. Many private suits claiming an astronomical amount of money
are being held in abeyance awaiting further decisions on these issues.
7. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co,. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 89 S.Ct. 1454 (1964).
8. Id. at 850, n. 12; See also Brophy v. Cities Service, 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70
A.2d 5 (1949).
9. Board of Comm'rs v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 515 (1873).
10. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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mally be no fiduciary duty in such a situation, the "special facts" in the
possession of the majority shareholder gave rise to a duty to disclose those
facts. In Hotchkiss v. Fisher"l another director was held to have a duty to
disclose material information to a shareholder before purchasing his stock.
"Directors act in a fiduciary capacity in the management of corporate
affairs, and a director negotiating with a shareholder for purchase of shares
acts in a relation of scrupulous trust and confidence."'12 However, any duty
imposed was a matter of state law and varied considerably from state to
state.
Based upon Rule lOb-5, the courts in the early cases of Kardon v. Na-
tional Gypsum Co.1 3 and Speed v. Transamerica Corp.14 created a cause of
action in situations formerly actionable only under the "fiduciary duty" or
"special facts" doctrine. However, only recently has Rule 10b-5 been ex-
tended to any degree beyond these two doctrines. The major breakthrough
came in a proceeding before the SEC. In Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.' 5
the SEC adopted the so-called "relationship giving access" test to determine
upon whom falls the duty to disclose all material information before trading
in the securities involved. Under this test, this duty rests on two elements:
[F]irst, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes ad-
vantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.' 6
Various relationships which a person might have with the corporation could
be "relationships giving access" and could create a duty to disclose infor-
mation before trading, thereby creating liability for non-disclosure.
It is well settled law that directors, officers, and major stockholders
enjoy an "insider" relationship with the corporation, and as insiders, are
liable for non-disclosure of material information.17 But the court in Texas
Gulf Sulphur made no differentiation between those defendants who were
officers or directors and those who were only employees, classing all of them
as "insiders." The employees involved were an engineer, two geologists, a
corporate attorney, and an office manager. The complaint was dismissed as
to the office manager but only because he did not know about the discovery,
not because of his position.
Members of the insider's family are evidently prohibited from trading
in securities to the same extent as the insider himself.' 8 A portion of the
shares in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case alleged to have been purchased by
defendants Holyk and Mollison were actually purchased in the names of
11. 156 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
12. Id. at 538, 16 P.2d at 535 (1932).
13. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
14. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
15. 40 SEC 907 (1961).
16. Id. at 912.
17. Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
18. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 841 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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their wives. However, the court treated these transactions as if the defend-
ants had made the purchases in their own names. Since there was no attempt
to hold the wives liable for any of the trading, it follows that insiders will
be held liable for such unlawful trading by members of their families.
Brokers who receive inside information have been held to be insiders
or at least to be in violation of Rule 10b-5 if they trade in the security while
in possession of undisclosed material information. In Matter of Cady, Rob-
erts & Co.,19 a partner in a brokerage firm sold shares in the Curtis-Wright
Corporation after being informed by an associate, who was also a director
of Curtis-Wright, that the company was preparing to announce a dividend
cut. The SEC found that his actions violated Rule 10b-5 without deciding
if he was an "insider."20
The issuing corporation itself can be liable as an "insider."21 If the
securities are callable at the issuer's option, there would seem to be no
need for disclosure. However, in straight offers to purchase or sell shares,
the corporation is under an obligation to disclose material information to
the same extent as a director or officer would be if he had made the offer.22
One category of persons whose liability is uncertain is that of "quasi-
insiders," i.e. persons who have gained information through business trans-
actions with the corporation. This information may be in the form of secret
financial data disclosed in order to borrow money or for some other corpo-
rate purpose; the information may be merely that the securities trader and
the corporation have entered into some contract which is highly favorable
to the corporation; or the trader may be attempting to buy outstanding
shares, knowing that once he accumulates substantially all the shares, or
at least controlling shares, he can increase the profit of the corporation or
sell these shares at a higher price. There is little authority regarding possible
liability in the first two situations. However, it seems probable that liability
would be imposed for non-disclosure because there is a relationship giving
access to information intended to be used only for corporate purposes. In
regard to the third example, the available case law indicates that the non-
shareholder or non-insider who is attempting to buy control of the corpo-
ration has no duty to disclose his plans. In Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,2 3 the
defendant had offered to purchase substantially all of the stock in a bridge-
owning corporation knowing that once it had completed these purchases,
it could sell the shares in a block for more than the purchase price. The
price offered for the shares by defendant was in excess of the market price
but lower than the price for which they could be sold by defendant. The
court concluded that since the offered price was above market, surely the
shareholders knew that the defendant had some profit-making purpose in
buying the shares.2 4
19. 40 SEC 907 (1961).
20. Id. at 912. See also, List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965),
where dictum indicates broker would have been liable if he had possessed material
information.
21. Ward LaFrance Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373 (1943).
22. Ibid. See also, BROMBERG, SEcuRITms LA w, Fraud 130-32 (1967).
23. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955).
24. Id. at 764.
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In Speed v. Transamerica Corp.,2 5 on similar facts, but where the at-
tempt at control was made by an existing shareholder, the defendant was
held to have violated Rule 10b-5. The cases are distinguishable in that the
defendant in Sarjem obtained his information outside the corporation while
the shareholder in Speed obtained his information through the corporation.
Professor Bromberg concludes that the Sarjem case would be decided dif-
ferently today:26
Since a tender offer from an outsider is frequently a prelude
to further combination (by merger, asset sale, etc.) and the shares
acquired in the tender offer may make the necessary vote a fore-
gone conclusion, or even dispense with it entirely, it is probable
that a disclosure of intention about this must be made. Slightly
more broadly, he is likely to have to disclose his plans for operation
or disposition of the business.2 7
If this view is accepted by the courts and liability is imposed without any
relationship between the offeror and the corporation and without the use
of any information obtained from the corporation, there would appear to
be liability without the fraud or deceit required by Rule lOb-5. Thus far
no court has accepted this view,2 8 and it is possible that the question will
not arise in the courts again, since in 1968, Congress added sections 14 (d)
and (e)2 9 to the 1934 Act. These sections require affirmative disclosures
from any person making a cash tender offer for 10% or more of the out-
standing shares of any class stock of a corporation registered under section 12
of the 1934 Act. It is unlikely that a person would violate Rule lob-5 with-
out violating new section 14 (d) in situations such as Speed or Sarjem.
Another category of securities traders whose liability is uncertain is
that of persons who, though not insiders themselves, receive material in-
formation from an insider. These are the so-called "tippees." In the Texas
Gulf Sulphur case, three persons were advised to buy TGS stock or were
given information about the stock by defendant Darke. Two of these per-
sons then gave the information to three others. All six bought TGS stock
prior to the official disclosure of the discovery. Defendant Darke was held
liable for the purchases made by these six persons although no indication
was given as to an appropriate remedy. However, the nature of the "tippees"
liability (if liable at all) is unclear since they were not joined in the action.
A reason for the failure to join them may have been that the SEC was un-
certain of their liability, or that the Commission elected to hold only Darke
liable. Another possibility is that the SEC did not want to complicate fur-
ther an already complicated case.
There is case law indicating that the "tippees" could have been held
liable. In Ross v. Licht8O five directors, officers, and "substantial" stockhold-
25. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
26. BROMBERG, SECURTIES LAw, Fraud 117 (1967).
27. Id. at 119.
28. Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967) appears
to have rejected this theory in denying a claim for damages under Rule lOb-5.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (d), (e) 1969 Supp.
30. 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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ers joined with three of their friends to purchase outstanding shares and then
to issue new shares to be sold to the public at a considerably higher price.
The three friends were held liable along with the others as insiders, as tip-
pees, and as aiders and abettors. The court stated, "If Sidney, Grapel and
Bluestone were not insiders, they would seem to have been 'tippees' (persons
given information by insiders in breach of trust) and subject to the same duty
as insiders. 3''s The court gave considerable attention to the close relation-
ship between the "tippees" and the management of the corporation and
the fact that the "tippees" were actively involved in the plans which were
concealed from the shareholders. However, if the statement by the New
York district court is to be accepted literally, the mere fact that they were
given information would be sufficient to create liability for trading. In
Matter of Merill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,3 2 the brokerage firm had
obtained material information regarding Douglas Aircraft stock while
underwriting an issue of new securities for Douglas. After passing this in-
formation to several favored investment firms who immediately sold their
Douglas stock, the firm and several of its employees were held to have vio-
lated Rule 10b-5. The SEC has indicated 33 that it intends to proceed against
the "tippees" who traded in the Douglas stock and to test their liability.3 4
In Texas Gulf Sulphur it seems likely that the three "tippees" who were
given information by Darke had the required "relationship giving access,"
since they obtained their information from a corporate insider. In regard
to the "tippees" who received information from the "primary tippees,"
there was a relationship giving access to information intended to be used
only for corporate purposes, but the relationship was so indirect that it is
not at all certain that liability for non-disclosure would be imposed.3 5
In each instance it makes little, if any, difference under Rule 10b-5
whether the transaction is a sale or purchase,3 6 or whether the transaction
is handled on a person to person basis37 or through brokers38 or exchanges,3 9
as long as one of the three requirements of Rule 10b-5 is met: use of (1) in-
terstate commerce, (2) mails, or (3) any national securities exchange. The
importance of the transaction lies in its substance rather than its form.4 0
The "relationship giving access" test appears to be the best criteria
available at this time for determining liability for non-disclosure. The
court in Texas Gulf Sulphur firmly established this test by applying it in
31. Id. at 410.
32. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
33. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 10, 1969, at 2, col. 2.
34. However, note that all of the "tippees" were investment advisors under
SEC jurisdiction. The relief sought consists of barring the "tippees" from "associat-
ing with or acting as broker-dealers."
35. But see SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853 (2d Cir. 1968).
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 89 S.Ct. 1454 (1969). The court, after holding Darke in viola-
tion of Rule lob-5, noted that the actions of all of the "tippees" "certainly could be
equally reprehensible."
36. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
37. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
38. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
39. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
40. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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this very important case. It is submitted that the courts should not extend
liability under 10b-5 any further or no one will be able to trade securities
without fear of liability. If this test is broadened, Rule 10b-5 liability could
extend indefinitely. As one professor jokingly foresees:
Under Rule 10b-5 whenever stock is sold, if the price goes up
-the seller can sue the buyer; if the price goes down-the buyer
can sue the seller; if the price remains absolutely the same, each
one can sue the other for interest.4 '
This is certainly not the intention of the SEC in promulgating Rule 10b-5.
LuND K. MiscHr
CODEFENDANT'S CONFESSION IN A JOINT TRIAL
Bruton v. United States'
George Bruton and William Evans were tried by a jury and convicted
on a federal charge of armed postal robbery.2 During post-arrest interro-
gation, Evans had confessed to the robbery, implicating Bruton as an accom-
plice. Evans' confession, including the incriminating references to Bruton,
was introduced in the joint trial. At the close of the government's case and
again in his instructions to the jury, the trial judge instructed the jurors
to disregard the confession in considering the evidence against Bruton. On
appeal, Evans' conviction was reversed for the failure of the authorities to
comply with the requirements of Miranda,3 but the conviction of Bruton
was affirmed.4 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Bruton's
conviction on the ground that the cautionary jury instruction was ineffective
to protect Bruton's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
Evans' confession incriminating Bruton was not admissible against
Bruton because of traditional hearsay limitations. Nor was it admissible
against Bruton under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule because
41. 24 Bus. LAw. 69 (1968).
1. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
2. Evans v. United States, 875 F.2d 355 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 389 U.S.
818 (1967).
3. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This decision requires that any
person subjected to custodial police interrogation must first be informed that he
has a right to remain silent, that anything said may be used against him, and that
he has the right to have counsel present throughout the interrogation.
4. Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355, 361 (8th Cir. 1967). The circuit
court assumed that the jurors, heeding the cautionary jury instruction, would be
able to disregard the confession when considering the evidence againist the non-
declarant. See Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957). Therefore, it was
immaterial to the affirmance of Bruton's conviction that Evans' conviction was
reversed. Any infirmity in Evans' confession could not have tainted Bruton's con-
viction since the confession allegedly was not considered against Bruton.
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that exception allows the extrajudicial statements of one conspirator into
evidence against another only if the statements were made in the presence
of the co-conspirator or were made with his implied authority or consent
in the furtherance of the conspiracy.5 Thus, in a joint trial a procedural
device protects the non-confessing defendant when the confession is offered,
but it is admitted against the confessing defendant.
The advantages of a single trial for multiple defendants have long been
recognized by the government. Joint trials are preferred over separate trials
for the ostensible reason that separate trials are duplicative and expensive.8
Since extrajudicial statements are admissible in a joint trial only as admis-
sions of the declarant, the court must guard against allowing the jury to
consider such declarations when determining the guilt or innocence of a
non-declaring codefendant. Heretofore, when the confession of a codefend-
ant was admitted, the widely accepted remedial device used to protect the
non-declarant was a cautionary jury instruction similar to the one used in
Bruton.T Bruton clearly rejected this practice, expressly overruling Delli
Paoli v. United States, in which the Court had sanctioned the use of the
jury instruction as an effective safeguard for the non-declarant.8
The Court in Bruton recognized that the admission of the codefendant's
confession may have prejudicial consequences beyond the normal hearsay
dangers. The primary reason for the exclusion of hearsay statements is the
inability of the opposing party to cross-examine the declarant. In a crim-
inal trial the inability of the defendant to cross-examine witnesses against
him violates the right of confrontation guaranteed to him by the sixth
amendment.9 The danger of a violation of the sixth amendment resulted
in the reversal of Bruton's conviction. The Court found that Evans' con-
fession might have influenced the jury when it weighed the evidence against
Bruton, and thus the Court rejected the assumption that a cautionary jury
instruction is a suitable protective device for the non-declarant. 10 Although
the Court alluded to possible "viable alternatives"-" that might supplant
the jury instruction, it failed to elaborate. 2 Thus, one is led to ask whether
5. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949); Fiswick v. United States,
329 U.S. 211 (1946); Brown v. United States, 150 U.S. 93 (1893); 4 J. WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE §§ 104849 (3d ed. 1940).
6. For a discussion of other factors that may motivate a prosecutor to seek
a joint trial, see the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United
States, supra note 5. On evidentiary advantages generally, see Klein, Conspiracy-
The Prosecutor's Darling, 24 BROOKLYN L. REv. 1 (1957).
7. Annot., 54 A.L.R.2d 830 (1957).
8. 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968).
9. Fifth amendment privileges available to the confessor preclude his ap-
pearance as a witness. If the confession should influence the jury's deliberation
as to the non-confessor, the confessing codefendant would in effect be appearing
as a witness against the non-declarant. The sixth amendment guarantees to a de-
fendant the right to confront the witnesses against him. Id. at 128.
10. Jury research conducted at the University of Chicago has suggested that
the actual effect of a limiting instruction may be to compound the difficulty of thejury in disregarding inadmissible evidence and give more weight to the evidence
than it would have had if nothing had been said. Broeder, The University of Chi-
cago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744 (1959).
11. 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968).
12. Id. at 143.
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it is possible to secure the advantages of a joint trial, which include the
evidentiary advantages resulting from the admission of the confession of
one defendant, and at the same time insulate the non-dedarant in order to
preserve his right of confrontation.
There are several alternatives to the jury instruction which might
be used to protect a co-defendant but still permit a joint trial. One method
is the deletion from the incriminating statement of all references to the
non-confessing co-defendant. 13 When all references to the non-declarant
have been deleted, it is impossible for the jury to consider the confession
against the non-confessor. A variation of this method is the substitution of
a fictitious name for the non-declarant's name when it appears in the text
of the confession. Each time the non-dedarant's name is mentioned in the
confession it is replaced by "Mr. X" or "Mr. Blank."14 In order to protect
the codefendant, some courts require the deletion to be an effective one,
and to be effective the deletion must exclude not only direct but also in-
direct identification of the non-confessor.' 5 Therefore, once his identity
has otherwise been established, not only his name, but any portion of the
confession which might inculpate the codefendant should be stricken.' 6 If
his connection with the declarant has previously been established by inde-
pendent evidence, any use of the confession would be greatly suspect as an
encroachment upon the non-dedarant's right of confrontation. A further
limitation imposed by the courts demands that all deletions must be with-
out prejudice to the confessor. 17 The concern here is not only with the
confessor's right to have the jury consider the complete text of the statement,
but also with the jury's interest in hearing all of the evidence against the
dedarant.18
Assuming that an "edited" confession conforms to the required stand-
ards, there still remains the question of whether a juror is likely to con-
clude for himself that "Mr. X" is actually the non-declaring codefendant.
The jury having seen the defendants tried together and having heard the
confession alluding to "Mr. X," it seems unrealistic to assume that the
jurors will not deduce the real identity of the mysterious "anonymous no-
13. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); Oliver v. United States, 335 F.2d
724 (D.C. Cir. 1964); People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 407 P.2d 265, 47 Cal. Rptr.
353 (1965); 3 CoLum. J.L. &c Soc. PROB. 80 (1967).
14. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410-12 (1945); Oliver v. United
States, supra note 13. The court should hesitate to substitute false names which
do not sound fictitious for fear of giving the non-confessor the benefit of a wholly
erroneous, favorable inference. 24 U. OF CHi. L. REv. 710, 713 (1957).
15. People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 530, 407 P.2d 265, 273, 47 Cal. Rptr.
353, 360 (1965).
16. Id. at 530, 407 P.2d at 273, 47 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
17. Ibid. Similar rules concerning joint trial have been adopted in other
jurisdictions and have been found workable. See, e.g., State v. Castelli, 92 Conn.
58, 101 A. 476 (1917); People v. Barbaro, 395 Ill. 264, 69 N.E.2d 692 (1946); People
v. Bolton, 339 Ill. 225, 171 N.E. 152 (1930); State v. Rosen, 151 Ohio. St. 339, 86
N.E.2d 24 (1949).
18. 72 HAutv. L. REv. 920, 990 (1959). As to dangers when law enforcement
agents have discretion to reveal only selected portions of a statement, see United
States v. Volkell, 251 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 962 (1958).
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body."'10 The probability seems remote that the device of deleting the non-
declarant's name will effectively insulate the non-declarant from his co-
defendant's confession.
A second alternative is the modified joint trial. This technique would
permit the jury to hear all of the evidence admissible against both defend-
ants with the exception of the confession or admission. The jury would then
come to a verdict as to the guilt or innocence of the non-confessor alone.
After this determination, the jury would hear the confessions or admissions
and render a separate verdict as to the confessor.2 0 This plan, however, raises
serious questions. What is the impact of the confession upon the jury when
it is heard in an isolated proceeding? Does isolation of the confession lend
more weight to the statement than it would have during the normal course
of the trial-so much weight as to be unduly prejudicial? To what extent
does such a procedure conflict with the standard cautionary jury instruction
which warns the jury not to discuss the case with anyone, including their
fellow jurors, before submission for their final deliberation?2' Can the jury
effectively consider only one defendant at a time? The modified joint trial
seems to require the jury to think in watertight compartments, the very
mental gymnastics which Bruton expressly rejected. Thus, it appears
doubtful that the Supreme Court would consider the modified joint trial
among the "viable alternatives."
One alternative which would assure protection for the non-confessing
codefendant, but diminishes the availability of the joint trial, was articulated
by Judge Frank, dissenting in Delli Paoli. It may be described as the "sever
or exclude" rule.22 Under this rule, if the confession were found to be prej-
udicial, the government would have two pre-trial options. It could sever
the defendants for trial and admit the confession only in the separate trial
of the confessor, or it could join the defendants for trial and not introduce
the confession at all. Thus, the benefits of a joint trial would be retained
only if the government thought there was sufficient evidence aside from
the confession to sustain the declarant's conviction. Objections to severance,
however, stem from the added burden on court dockets that would result
from "expensive and duplicitious" separate trials.2 3 Further grounds for
opposition to the sever or exclude rule ensue from the rooted common law
doctrine that severance of properly joined defendants shall be in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge.2 4 Reviewing courts rarely find an abuse of this
19. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953); accord, Greenwall v. United
States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Schaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th
Cir. 1955).
20. 3 COLUM. J. L. g. Soc. PROB. 80 (1967).
21. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 899 (1945). See, e.g., Mo. Approved Instr. 2.01 (1964).
22. Delli Paoli v. United States, 229 F.2d 319, 324 (2d Cir. 1956), afrd, 352
U.S. 232 (1957).
23. United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v.
Andreadis, 238 F. Supp. 800 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); United States v. Smith, 209 F. Supp.
907 (E.D. Ill. 1962); United States v. Dioguardi, 20 F.R.D. 10 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 237
F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1956).
24. Rizzo v. United States, 304 F.2d 810 (8th Cir. 1962); Costello v. United
States, 255 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1958); Kansas City Star v. United States, 240 F.2d
643 (8th Cir. 1957); Hall v. United States, 168 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 853 (1948).
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discretion, and they have consistently found that the admission of a co-
defendant's confession in a joint trial is not adequate grounds for sever-
ance.
25
The opinion in the Bruton case demands a reassessment of these prior
attitudes toward severance. The Court did not speak directly to the question
of severance, nor did it attempt to suggest any alternatives to the jury in-
struction. But in overruling Delli Paoli, the Court effectively met and over-
came the chief resistance to the adoption of the sever or exclude rule. The
Court adopted Judge Lehman's statement that, "[w]e secure greater speed,
economy and convenience in the administration of law at the price of
fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too high."2 0
Thus, the balance between (a) the interest of the government in the greater
administrative efficiency resulting from joint trials, and (b) the interest
of the non-confessor in the protection of his right of confrontation, has
been struck in favor of the non-declarant and his separate trial. Further-
more, since the doctrine of severance as a matter of judicial discretion is
based upon case law which assumed the efficacy of the protective jury in-
struction, the Court's rejection of the jury instruction substantially dimin-
ishes the doctrine's vitality.
Procedural difficulties which might arise from the use of the sever or
exclude rule are mitigated by the amendment to rule 14 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. This amendment allows the trial court, in
ruling on a pre-trial motion for severance, to order the prosecution to de-
liver for in camera inspection any statements or confessions made by de-
fendants which may be introduced into evidence at trial2T Should the con-
fession prejudice the non-confessor, the Court would then decide whether
to sever the defendants for separate trials or to conduct a joint trial with
the confession excluded.2 8 The additional burdens upon criminal admin-
istration may not be nearly as great as claimed by opponents of the sever
or exclude rule since separate trials would be required only where the gov-
ernment believed the confession necessary to gain conviction of the de-
clarant. If other evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, a joint trial
would still be available.
25. Cases cited note 24 supra.
26. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968). Many states require by
statute that defendants accused of certain crimes be severed for trial. E.g., § 545.880,
RSMo 1963 Supp.
27. FED. R. CRim. P. 14, Relief from Prejudicial Joinder:
If it appears that a defendant . . .is prejudiced by a joinder . . .of
defendants ... the courts may ... grant a severance of defendants or pro-
vide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a
defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the govern-
ment to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or
confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to in-
troduce in evidence at trial.
28. From the notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules it appears that thepurpose of the amendment to rule 14 is to provide a procedure whereby the issue
of possible prejudice can be resolved on the motion for severance. The judge may
direct the disclosure of the confessions or statements of the defendants to him for
in camera inspection as an aid to determining whether the possible prejudicejustifies ordering separate trials. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14, Advisory Committee Notes(1966).
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Although the various proposals designed to allow the introduction of
a codefendant's confession in a joint trial allow efficiency, it is virtually
impossible to prevent the confession from being prejudicially considered
when the jury weighs the evidence against the non-declarant. In light of the
important constitutional issues involved, the Bruton opinion may very well
lead to the adoption of the "sever or exclude" rule as the only "viable"
alternative available. It may no longer be possible to admit even an edited
confession of a codefendant in a joint trial without violating the non-de-






In Theiss defendant, an attorney representing a party in an impending
will contest, addressed a letter to the counsel for plaintiff, intimating that
the plaintiff, who had a financial interest in the outcome of the contest,
was a wastrel indulging in "a little piece of blackmail." Plaintiff sued de-
fendant for libel. Defendant, however, interposed the defense that the state-
ment arose out of, or was made in the course of, a judicial proceeding, and
hence was absolutely privileged. The court agreed with defendant, holding
that communications between attorneys are absolutely privileged "if they
have relevance to, and are made during the course of, a judicial proceeding
in which the attorneys are participating as counsel." 3 The court bottomed
its reasoning on a public policy consideration: rights of clients should not
be imperiled by subjecting their attorneys to the fear of suits for libel or
slander. An attorney is an officer of the court, the opinion noted, and thus
abuses of the privilege are inhibited by being subject to disciplinary action.
In Weiner defendant sent a letter to the Grievance Committee of the
New York City Bar Association charging the plaintiff, an attorney, with
dishonesty and fraud. In plaintiff's libel suit, the court found for defendant.
Because complaints charging professional misconduct were required by
statute and court rule4 to be filed with the grievance committee of a bat
1. 396 F.2d 646 (6th Cir. 1968).
2. 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 346, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968).
3. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1968).
4. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 90 (7):
A majority of the justices of the appellate division of the supreme
court in each department may appoint any attorney and counsellor-at-
law to conduct a preliminary investigation and to prosecute any dis-
ciplinary proceedings ....
Acting pursuant thereto the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Dept.,
promulgated Part Four, Rule 12 of the court rules:
Upon application by the chairman or acting chairman of the Coin-
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association, the court held that such complaints initiated judicial, or at
least quasi-judicial, proceedings to which the absolute privilege to communi-
cate relevant or pertinent, though defamatory, material, would attach. 5 The
court also noted that it is in the public interest to encourage persons with
knowledge of dishonest or unethical conduct by a lawyer to impart that
knowledge to a grievance committee or other such body, and that this public
interest outweighed the possible harm to plaintiff.
It has been uniformily held that statements made during the course of
a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged, and thus no action for def-
amation is maintainable thereon. The privilege extends to judges,1
witnesses, s and parties, 9 to statements contained in affidavits' 0 and plead-
ings," and to statements by counsel.12 Although a majority of authorities
agree that the privilege applies to statements in open court,13 there is some
disagreement as to the extent to which statements made out of court are
protected. While most courts stretch the privilege to cover such state-
ments,1 4 a few extend it further than others.15
mittee on Grievances of any recognized Bar Association in the Second Ju-
dicial Department disclosing that such committee is conducting a prelim-
inary investigation of professional misconduct on the part of an attorney
... the clerk of this court shall issue subpoenas in the name of the Pre-
siding Justice for the attendance of witnesses and production of books
and papers before such committee....
Each committee or subcommittee conducting such a preliminary in-
vestigation is empowered to take and transcribe the evidence of witnesses,
who may be sworn by any person authorized by law to administer oaths.
5. 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 346, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968). The court cited
Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1958).
6. "Absolute privilege" confers an immunity from suit. On the other hand,
a 'qualified! or "conditional" privilege only bars action when the statement was
made without legal malice and other requirements have been met. See generally
PROSSiER, TORTS, § 110, 805-823 (3d ed. 1964).
7. Ginger v. Bowles, 369 Mich. 680, 120 N.W.2d 842 (1963).
8. Felts v. Paradise, 178 Tenn. 421, 158 S.W.2d 727 (1942).
9. Lann v. Third Nat. Bank in Nashville, 198 Tenn. 70, 277 S.W.2d 439
(1955).
10. Glasson v. Bowen, 84 Colo. 57, 267 P. 1066 (1928).
11. Taliaferro v. Sims, 187 F.2d 6 (5th Cir. 1951).
12. Renner v. Chilton, 142 Colo. 454, 351 P.2d 277 (1960).
13. Cf. Renner v. Chilton, 142 Colo. 454, 351 P.2d 277 (1960); Wells v. Car-
ter, 164 Tenn. 400, 50 S.W.2d 228 (1932).
14. In Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W.2d
521 (1951), the court held that the absolute privilege applied to conferences be-
tween an attorney and a prospective witness in an action then pending or con-templated. RE STATEMET Or TORTS § 588 (1934), states that:
a witness is absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter
of another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceed-
ing and as a part of judicial proceeding in which he is testifying, if it has
some relation thereto. (Emphasis added.)
15. In Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 .(8th Cir. 1966), the court held
that defamatory statements made by an attorney in a newspaper were absolutely
privileged since "all signs pointed to incipient litigation and to the necessity
for protective action." Id. at 37.
But in Kennedy v. Cannon, 229 Md. 92, 182 A.2d 54 (1961), the Maryland
court refused to extend the absolute privilege to a statement made by defense
counsel in a newspaper in the same article with statements of the prosecutor.
1970]
62
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol35/iss1/10
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Whether a court will extend this absolute privilege to out-of-court
statements is extremely important to attorneys such as the defendant in
the Theiss case. While it is clear that many such statements by attorneys
will be protected, there exists no clearly defined line where the absolute
privilege becomes merely a conditional privilege.16 Comment A to section
586 of the Restatement of Torts argues that the absolute privilege applies
to statements of attorneys in conferences and to other communications pre-
liminary to the institution of proceedings, as well as to statements in the
course of judicial proceedings. 17 This view is uniformly followed when
these statements arise out of a judicial proceeding.'8 The Restatement re-
quires that these communications have only "some relation" to the judicial
proceeding pending or contemplated.' 9 At present only four states use a
form of the "some relation" test,20 while a majority of jurisdictions require
that the statement be in some way relevant or pertinent to an issue in the
suit.21 However, many courts are slowly gravitating to the Restatement posi-
tion. The Theiss court in reality employed the "some relation" test 22 in
holding the letter written to another attorney absolutely privileged. 23
Use of the "some relation" test will result in extending the absolute
privilege to letters written between attorneys prior to the commencement
of the judicial proceeding. In jurisdictions requiring that the statement
"arise out of a judicial proceeding" there may be considerable uncertainty
as to the extent to which such letters are privileged. The "some relation"
test would compel greater certainty because defamatory statements having
no relation to the subject matter of the controversy "are not in fact pub-
16. Statements made in pursuance of some moral duty are only conditionally
privileged.
17. RFsrATEMENT OF ToRTs § 586, comment a (1934).
18. Schwartz v. Bartle, 49 Misc. 2d 848, 268 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1966); Middlesex
Concrete Products v. Carteret Industrial Ass'n, 68 N.J. Super. 85, 172 A.2d 22
(1961); Renner v. Chilton, 142 Colo. 454, 351 P.2d 277 (1960); Richeson v. Kessler,
73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953); Zirn v. Cullom, 187 Misc. 241, 63 N.Y.S.2d
439 (1946).
19. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 586 (1934), and comments.
20. Often the courts in these states use such words as "relevancy" or "perti-
nency," but the overall structure of their opinions and the results reached indi-
cate that they only require that the communication have some relation to the judi-
cial proceeding. Thornton v. Rhoden, 24 Cal. App. 2d 80, 53 Cal. Rptr. 706 (1966);
Seltzer v. Fields, 13 N.Y.2d 927, 244 N.Y.S.2d 72 (1963); Renner v. Chilton, 142
Colo. 454, 351 P.2d 277 (1960); Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707
(1953).
The English courts apply a similar rule. Munster v. Lamb, [1883] 11 Q.B.D.
588; Seaman v. Netherclift, [1876] 2 C.P.D. 53.
21. Middlesex Concrete Products v. Carteret Industrial Ass'n, 68 N.J. Super.
85, 172 A.2d 22 (1961); Robinson v. Home Fire 9- Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120,
49 N.W.2d 521 (1951); Adams v. Alabama Lime & Stone, 225 Ala. 174, 142 So.
424 (1932); Magelo v. Roundup Coal Mining Co., 109 Mont. 293, 96 P.2d 932 (1939).
The defamatory publication does not have to meet the relevancy tests re-
quired for submission into evidence however. See Taliaferro v. Sims, 187 F.2d 6 (5th
Cir. 1951); Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528, 110 P.2d 190 (1941).
22. Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1968). The court cited the
Restatement, although it employed the phrase "relevant or pertinent."
23. There was considerable prior New York authority for the court's position.
Cf. Zirn v. Cullom, 187 Misc. 241, 63 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1946); Schwartz v. Bartle, 49
Misc, 2d 848, 268 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1966).
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lished in a judicial proceeding even though such defamatory words are pub-
lished during the progress of a trial."24 Thus defamatory letters having no
relation to the matter in dispute-would not arise out of nor would they be
published in the course of a judicial proceeding. Consequently, they would
have no claim whatsoever to the absolute privilege. 25
Since the ultimate raison d'etre of the absolute privilege rests upon the
exigencies of sound public policy,26 most jurisdictions, including England,
have treated quasi-judicial proceedings commensurately with judicial pro-
ceedings. The absolute privilege has been applied to hearings before any
tribunal performing a judicial function. 27 This includes lunacy proceed-
ings,28 bankruptcy proceedings, 29 naturalization proceedings, 30 election
contest,3 1 and other activities connected therewith.3 2 Courts have also ap-
plied it to proceedings before purely quasi-judicial boards and commis-
sions, such as a state labor commission,3 3 the National Labor Relations
Board,34 the Civil Aeronautics Board,35 grievance committees of bar as-
24. Irwin v. Newby, 10Z Cal. App. 110, 116, 282 P. 810, 810 (1929).
25. This result would follow in another situation as well: it is generally held
that the absolute privilege will not protect statements made in judicial proceedings
where the court does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, the
mere fact that the defamatory statement was published in an insufficient bill or
complaint does not necessarily destroy the privilege. Hager v. Major, 353 Mo. 1166,
186 S.W.2d 564 (1945). See also Annot., 158 A.L.R. 592 (1945).
26. In these cases the interests of society require that on certain occasions no
civil liability attach to utterances or publications by individuals, even though such
are false and malicious. Note, 1 WAsrmus.m L.J. 493 (1961).
But:
Emphasizing that it is the occasion which determines the privilege,
and not the communication, the courts do not regard every exercise of
judicial discretion as an automatic criteron for invoking absolute privi-
lege: Nelkin, Defamation-Absolute Privilege as Extended to Quasi-Judi-
cial Proceeding, 13 Mo. L. Rnv. 320, 321 (1948).
"This rule should be and usually is confined strictly to cases in which
the public service or the administration of justice require complete im-
munity ... " Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954).
27. See Nelkin, Defamation-Absolute Privilege as Extended to Quasi-Judicial
Proceedings, 13 Mo. L. Rxv. 320 (1948).
28. Dyer v. Dyer, 178 Tenn. 234, 156 S.W.2d 445 (1941).
29. Abrams v. Crompton-Richmond Co., 7 Misc. 2d 461, 164 N.Y.S.2d 124
(1957).
30. Nickovich v. Mollart, 51 Nev. 306, 274 P. 809 (1929).
31. Penick v. Ratcliffe, 149 Va. 618, 140 S.E. 664 (1927).
32. For example, the recording of a notice of lis pendens has been held abso-
lutely privileged. Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 (1956). Like-
wise the writing of a will has been held absolutely privileged since it is "a founda-
tion of a legal proceeding." Nagle v. Nagle, 316 Pa. 507, 175 A. 487 (1934).
33. White v. United Mills Co., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (1948).
34. Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1966). This case is slightly
confusing, in that defamatory statements in a newspaper were deemed absolutely
privileged because they dealt with an election which the NLRB had ordered,
while an alleged re-utterance of these statements after the election was found ab-
solutely privileged because the speaker had come to the defense of the previous pub-
lication in anticipation of a lawsuit based thereon! In the opinion of this writer
the court extended the privilege beyond the bounds of credulity in the second in-
stance. Fear of the institution of judicial proceedings does not mean that statements
arise out of such a possible proceeding or have relation thereto.
35. Loudin v. Mohawk Airlines Inc., 44 Misc. 2d 926, 255 N.Y.S.2d 302 (1964).
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sociations,3 6 a county tax board,3 7 a director of a state's milk industry,3 8
an industrial board,3 9 and to proceedings in receivership. 40 Courts have
somewhat differing views as to what constitutes a quasi-judicial proceed-
ing, but the apparent test for determining whether the absolute privilege
attaches to proceedings before certain agencies is to scrutinize the agency's
procedural requirements. 41 "If similar to the procedure in a court and the
agency has power to punish for contempt," the court will generally include
proceedings before that agency within the ambit of the privilege.42 On the
other hand, some courts require that the agency's power in the matter be
derived from a statute.43 Letters written to such agencies, inaugurating pro-
ceedings, have been deemed absolutely privileged in some cases, 44 but only
if the letters actually institute those proceedings. The mere possibility that
they may be acted upon by the agency after review by some other inde-
pendent body or individual is not enough to cloak them with the privilege.4 5
In the area of disbarment proceedings, it is unclear whether letters of
complaint are always absolutely privileged. English courts have declared
such letters are in every instance absolutely priviegecL4 6 The noted New
York case, Weiner v. Weintraub,47 holds that they are absolutely privileged
when state statutes have clotherd the bar association committee involved
with quasi-judicial powers. A majority of American jurisdictions seem dis-
posed to follow Weiner and to extend the immunity, in proper cases.48 The
Oregon Supreme Court in Ramstead v. Morgan49 has gone so far as to
hold that a letter of complaint written to the Oregon State Bar Association
absolutely privileged, even though the body was not a creature of the legis-
lature, because the bar's own trial procedure had the trappings of a judicial
proceeding. There is, however, a dearth of judicial comment regarding the
Ramstead proposition that letters sent to bar associations which are not
clothed by statute with authority of a judicial nature are absolutely priv-
ileged.5 0
36. Weiner v. Weintraub, 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 346, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667
£1968); Ramstead v. Morgan, 219 Ore. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959). The remainder of
is note concerns these types of cases.
37. Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E.2d 709 (1939).
38. Rainers' Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms Inc., 117 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1955).
39. Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 219, 14 A. 518 (1888).
41. See Note, 35 N.C.L. R.v. 541 (1957).
42. Id. at 545.
43. White v. United Mills Co., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1948); Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1966).
44. White v. United Mills Co., supra note 43.
45. Sowder v. Nolan, 125 A.2d 52 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956). The defendant in
this case sent letters to the Chief of Police charging the plaintiff patrolman with
dishonesty. The Chief did not bring the review board's attention to them.
46. Lilley v. Roney, [1892] 61 L.J.Q.B. 727. Letter of complaint written to
Incorporated Law Society. The court stated that the action should have been for
malicious prosecution, which raises other interesting questions.
47. 22 N.Y.2d 330, 239 N.E.2d 346, 292 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1968).
48. See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 493 (1961).
49. 219 Ore. 383, 347 P.2d 594 (1959).
50. At the least, most courts would find these communications conditionally
privileged since the communicants may be under some moral duty to report pro-
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Since there are but a few Missouri cases bearing directly upon the
problems involved, the Missouri position must be gleaned as much from
dicta as from holdings of individual cases. In accord with the majority
American view, Missouri courts grant immunity to defamatory statements
made in the course of judicial proceedings51 when such statements are ut-
tered by the parties, the court, or counsel, or are contained in the plead-
ings, motions, affidavits, or other papers filed in court.52 However, no im-
munity will be afforded unless it appears that the court which entertained
the proceeding had jurisdiction over the subject matter,53 and also that
the statement was sufficiently relevant to the matter in controversy. 4
While there are no Missouri cases involving letters between attorneys,
dicta in other decisions indicate that such correspondence will be given the
closest scrutiny before being declared immune from suit. In Laun v. Union
Electric Co. of Missouri55 the Missouri Supreme Court refused to allow
the defendants to claim absolute privilege in a libel action based upon an
allegedly libelous complaint filed in federal court. The defendants were
not parties to the prior suit, but had merely supplied the information upon
which the complaint was based. The court noted that "when interest or
legal or moral duty is relied on as the basis of an immunity or a defense
the privilege asserted is conditional and not absolute." 56 The defendants,
"not in character as parties or pleaders to that privileged occasion or in-
stance [the judicial proceeding]", could not claim the absolute privilege. 57
At the minimum it would appear that a Missouri attorney claiming
the absolute privilege as to a letter written to another attorney must
establish that he represented a party to the proceeding. Whether the judicial
proceeding must be pending or merely contemplated is conjectural. The
answer depends upon whether Missouri courts will adopt the Restatement's
"some relation" test as utilized in Theiss. To this date Missouri courts have
been uniform in their use of the terms "relevancy" and "pertinency," but
the substantive definition of those terms seems to be somewhat nebulous.58
Missouri decisions are in accord with the view that the absolute priv-
ilege should be extended to statements made in proceedings before quasi-
fessional malfeasance because they have a substantial common interest therein.
See Lee v. W. E. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d 45
(1929).
51. Hager v. Major, 353 Mo. 1166, 186 S.W.2d 564 (1945); Laun v. Union
Electric Co. of Mo., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W.2d 1065 (1942).
52. Hager v. Major, supra note 51.
53. Hager v. Major, supra note 51; McCormick v. Ford Mfg. Co., 232 S.W.
1010 (Mo. 1921).
54. Jones v. Brownlee, 161 Mo. 258, 61 S.W. 795 (1901); Hyde v. McCabe,
100 Mo. 412, 13 S.W. 875 (1890).
55. Laun v. Union Electric Co. of Mo., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W.2d 1065 (1942).
56. Id. at 585, 166 S.W.2d at 1073. A conditional privilege confers no absolute
immunity from suit. See supra note 6.
57. Id. at 582, 166 S.W.2d at 1071.
58. White v. United Mills Co., Inc., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1948); Hager v. Major, 353 Mo. 1166, 186 S.W.2d 564 (1945); Laun v. Union
Electric Co. of Mo., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W.2d 1065 (1942); Jones v. Brownlee, 161 Mo.
258, 61 S.W. 795 (1901); Hyde v. McCabe, 100 Mo. 412, 13 S.W. 875 (1890). The
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judicial administrative bodies and agencies exercising a judicial function.5 0
The Missouri Supreme Court has emphasized in dictum, however, that the
body or agency must have been established by statute and that the com-
munication must be "provided for and required by law." 60 Statements made
in proceedings before private bodies (such as the Trial Committee of the
Brotherhood of Railway Carmen) are only conditionally privileged. 61
In an early case, Lee v. Fuetterer Battery and Supplies Co., 62 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court declared that a letter of complaint addressed to the
grievance committee of the St. Louis Bar Association was only conditionally
privileged. (Unfortunately, it was not argued before the court that the let-
ter should be absolutely privileged.) In reaching its conclusion the court
found the bar association akin to corporations, churches, medical societies,
and the like, communications within such bodies being only conditionally
privileged. 3 The only relevant statute dealing with disbarment proceed-
ings and complaints (now Section 484.200, RSMo 1959) did not grant, and
still does not grant to bar association grievance committees such as the one
involved in the Lee case any authority to handle complaints about profes-
sional misconduct. The statute declares that charges may be exhibited and
proceedings had thereon in a court of law, not before bar grievance com-
mittees.0 4
Following the Lee case, Missouri adopted an integrated bar system
in which attorneys are governed by rules promulgated by the supreme
court.6 6 Many other states have such a system, but Missouri is rather unique
in that the supreme court and a special agency created by it, the Missouri
Bar Administration, perform the disciplinary functions which the bar as-
sociations themselves perform in other integrated states.66 In the case of
59. The only Missouri decision directly in point is White v. United Mills Co.,
Inc., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S.W.2d 803 (K.C. Ct. App. 1948). The Missouri Supreme
Court held that a notice of separation sent by an employer to the Kansas Labor Com-
missioner was absolutely privileged. Although the court applied Kansas law, it was
probably declarative of the law in Missouri. See Brown v. Globe Printing Co., 213
Mo. 611, 112 S.W. 462 (1908), and Nelkin, Defamation-Absolute Privilege as Ex-
tended to Quasi-Judicial Proceedings, 13 Mo. L. Rrv. 320 (1948).
60. Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo. 1966).
61. Ibid.
62. 323 Mo. 1204, 23 S.W.2d 45 (1929).
63. Lee v. Fuetterer Battery & Supplies Co., 323 Mo. 1204, 1237-39, 23 S.W.2d
415, 62.63 (1929).
64. § 484.200, RSMo 1959:
Charges against an offending attorney shall be in writing and verified,
and may be preferred by any member of the bar in good standing, or by
any judge of a court of record required by law to be a person learned in
the law. Such charges may be exhibited and proceedings had thereon in
the supreme court, in any of the courts of appeals, or in the circuit court
of the county in which the actions or practices complained of shall have
been committed or the accused resides.
65. For a general discussion of the integrated bar, see Glaser, The Organiza-
tion of the Integrated Bar (Mimeographed Report of the Bureau of Applied Social
R search, Columbia University). Reprinted in V. Countryman and T. Finman, the
Lawyer in Modern Society, 348 (1966).
66. The Bar Administration is composed of Bar Committees, made up of at
least four lawyers, in each of the forty-three judicial circuits, an advisory committee,
and the General Chairman of Bar Committees.
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In re Richards6 7 decided in 1933, the Missouri Supreme Court declared
that it possessed the inherent power to disbar an attorney, independent of
any action of the legislature. Attorneys were said to be officers of the court
and thus could be controlled by court rules. Following this decision the
supreme court adopted Rules 35 through 38 (presently Rules 4 through 8)
governing Missouri attorneys. At present all complaints concerning mis-
conduct by an attorney, and proceedings based thereon, are governed by
Supreme Court Rule Five. Circuit Bar Committees have been established
under the authority of Rule 5.01, and these committees, composed of
lawyers, have been given power to investigate matters of professional mis-
conduct.6 8 When the majority of the members of a Circuit Bar Committee
finds reasonable cause to believe an accused attorney is guilty of professional
misconduct, the committee must hold a formal hearing, after notice to the
accused. At this hearing the attorney is given the right to refute the charges.
Should a majority of the committee then find that there is probable cause
to believe the accused is guilty of misconduct, the committee must file an
information in the circuit court, and, by leave of that court, may file the
information in the supreme court. Both the Circuit Bar Committees and
the accused attorneys are given the right to compulsory process. 69 In gen-
eral the powers and duties given the Circuit Bar Committees by the court
rules make them patently quasi-judicial bodies. 70
Since most, if not all, complaints regarding professional misconduct by
Missouri attorneys will be addressed to a Circuit Bar Committee, the im-
portant question is whether these complaints will be held absolutely priv-
ileged as they were in Weiner v. Weintraub. Because the Missouri Supreme
Court extends this immunity from suit only to communications addressed to
or made before bodies which are established by statutes or which exercise
a judicial function, it is essential to determine whether the Circuit Bar
Committees meet either of those requirements. Missouri courts have never
spoken directly on this question and it therefore is left for one to surmise
the answer.
It is obvious that the Circuit Bar Committees have been given sufficient
powers of a judicial nature for one to assert that they indeed exercise a
judicial function, for they, in effect, have been delegated some of the power
conferred upon courts by Section 484.200, RSMo 1959.71 An acceptable argu-
ment can also be made that the committees have been established pursuant
to statute. Section 484.040, RSMo 1959 grants the supreme court power to
admit and license persons to practice as attorneys. Section 484.200 gives the
court the responsibility for hearing charges of professional misconduct.
67. 333 Mo. 907, 63 S.W.2d 672 (En banc 1933). The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has turned this reasoning back on itself and held that it might refuse to
integrate the bar despite a contrary statutory dictate from the legislature. Integra-
tion of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 11 N.W.2d 604 (1943).
68. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.03.
69. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 5.04:
Upon application under the provisions of Section 5.03 of this rule, the
clerk of this Court shall issue writs of subpoena, including subpoena duces
tecum and dedimus to take dispositions ....
70. See generally Missouri Supreme Court Rule Five.
71. See supra note 64.
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Taken together these statutes must be read as an outward declaration that
the supreme court is to exercise some form of disciplinary authority over all
attorneys practicing within the state. Since there is no statute or constitu-
tional provision which prohibits the court from delegating this authority to
bodies under its control, the creation of the Circuit Bar Committees for the
purpose of exercising the supreme court's disciplinary authority seems
proper, and can be viewed as pursuant to statutory authority. Thus, it fol-
lows that the absolute privilege applies to Bar Committee proceedings in
Missouri.
In addition, Missouri decisions concerning the Bar Committees indi-
cate that the courts regard them as if they indeed exercised the judicial func-
tion of disciplining errant members of the bar, and that the courts consider
hearings before them substantially equivalent to hearings before a court
of law. Failure of a Circuit Bar Committee to prefer charges against an at-
torney has been held to amount under Rule Five to a finding that he was
not guilty.72 A Bar Committee may dismiss an information even after it has
been filed in a court of law.7 3 Further, the supreme court has stated that
the Canons of Ethics adopted by it as rules have the same force and effect
as decisions of the court.7 4 Given these decisions and the overall nature
of the integrated bar in Missouri, it can reasonably be predicted that in a
future case the supreme court will hold complaints to Circuit Bar Com-
mittees absolutely privileged.
The overall national tableau of decisions in cases of defamation which
concern attorneys at law grant the lawyer considerable freedom to malign
and abuse. Concomitantly, however, these decisions must be viewed as
forcing upon him a tantamount responsibility to exercise personal discre-
tion. While he is subject to only limited verbal rebuke by a judge in court
for abusing his privilege, he may be prevented from bringing a libel action
against those who malign him before his own bar association in jurisdictions
which follow Weiner. Missouri courts in the future will probably follow
the liberal lead on the subject of defamatory statements by counsel and will
most likely hold that complaints to the Circuit Bar Committees are ab-
solutely privileged. The Lee case indicates, however, that letters of com-
plaint written to other bar association bodies will only be conditionally
privileged since the supreme court has established particular agencies to
investigiate professional misconduct.
MICHAEL R. TuRLEY
72. In re Sizer, 134 S.W.2d 1085 (Spr. Mo. App. 1939).
73. In re Pate, 107 S.W.2d 157 (Spr. Mo. App. 1937).
74. In re Wilson, 391 S.W.2d 914 (Mo. 1965).
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